The SQL injection in Simple Inventory System's /delete.php endpoint is worse than its CVSS 7.3 suggests—not because the score is wrong, but because the scoring model isn't built for what this vulnerability actually does. This isn't a SELECT-based injection that reads data. It's a DELETE injection that can permanently remove inventory records from a system that likely lacks soft-delete logic or transaction logging. That distinction matters: when an attacker manipulates the ID parameter to execute DELETE statements, they're not just exfiltrating information—they're destroying the audit trail. There's no 'undo,' no recoverable row, no forensic remnant unless your application explicitly preserves deleted records as a business practice. Check your deployment now: does this inventory system implement soft-deletes, or is deletion permanent? If it's permanent, you're looking at a scenario where an attacker can render your inventory data unrecoverable without leaving the obvious forensic signatures that traditional incident response expects. The second factor the CVSS doesn't capture is operational context. Inventory databases don't exist in isolation—they synchronize with purchase orders, supplier relationships, accounting ledgers, and potentially IoT sensors tracking actual goods. When an attacker deletes inventory records, they're creating a gap between what your system believes exists and what actually exists. A manufacturing operation might reorder materials based on corrupted counts. An auditor reviewing deleted records loses legal defensibility. That's a business integrity failure, not just a data breach, and it's outside every scoring model in common use. The third factor is more immediate: this code appears to be abandoned. 'Simple Inventory System 1.0' carries a version number, but in code-projects repositories, that often means 'last updated years ago, maintainer unresponsive, issues closed.' There may be no patch coming. The traditional remediation timeline—disclosure, patch, apply, close—assumes a vendor who responds. This vulnerability may not have one. For organizations running this code, the question isn't 'when will the patch arrive' but 'can we afford to keep running an unauthenticated delete endpoint with no backup and no remediation path.' The EPSS score of 0.00263 reflects low automated scanning probability, but that metric assumes defenders are in the loop. If your inventory system is exposed and you found this through this note rather than a scanner, you're outside that loop. Prioritize network isolation or decommissioning rather than waiting for a fix that may never arrive.
CVE-2026-76990
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been found in code-projects Simple Inventory System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /delete.php. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisUntrusted input crosses into a downstream interpreter — SQL, a shell, an HTML page, an LDAP query — without being kept separate from the commands around it, so the attacker's data is read as instructions. This is the parent class behind SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and command injection alike. The durable fix is the same everywhere: keep data and code apart at every boundary, using parameterisation or context-aware encoding rather than building interpreted strings by concatenation.
General guidance for the injection class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThere is no version to upgrade to and no patch to apply. Every affected install stays exposed until the vendor ships a fix — or somebody else builds one.
Free. We build fixes in the order the community asks for them — and we’ll tell you the moment this one lands.
We develop and verify an original fix where the vendor hasn’t, from $4,900. Deployed to your staging first — never straight to production.
Scope it with usSee what else the community needs solved on the solutions-needed board.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-76990 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesThe SQL injection in Simple Inventory System's /delete.php endpoint is worse than its CVSS 7.3 suggests—not because the score is wrong, but because the scoring model isn't built for what this vulnerability actually does. This isn't a SELECT-based injection that reads data. It's a DELETE injection that can permanently remove inventory records from a system that likely lacks soft-delete logic or transaction logging. That distinction matters: when an attacker manipulates the ID parameter to execute DELETE statements, they're not just exfiltrating information—they're destroying the audit trail. There's no 'undo,' no recoverable row, no forensic remnant unless your application explicitly preserves deleted records as a business practice. Check your deployment now: does this inventory system implement soft-deletes, or is deletion permanent? If it's permanent, you're looking at a scenario where an attacker can render your inventory data unrecoverable without leaving the obvious forensic signatures that traditional incident response expects. The second factor the CVSS doesn't capture is operational context. Inventory databases don't exist in isolation—they synchronize with purchase orders, supplier relationships, accounting ledgers, and potentially IoT sensors tracking actual goods. When an attacker deletes inventory records, they're creating a gap between what your system believes exists and what actually exists. A manufacturing operation might reorder materials based on corrupted counts. An auditor reviewing deleted records loses legal defensibility. That's a business integrity failure, not just a data breach, and it's outside every scoring model in common use. The third factor is more immediate: this code appears to be abandoned. 'Simple Inventory System 1.0' carries a version number, but in code-projects repositories, that often means 'last updated years ago, maintainer unresponsive, issues closed.' There may be no patch coming. The traditional remediation timeline—disclosure, patch, apply, close—assumes a vendor who responds. This vulnerability may not have one. For organizations running this code, the question isn't 'when will the patch arrive' but 'can we afford to keep running an unauthenticated delete endpoint with no backup and no remediation path.' The EPSS score of 0.00263 reflects low automated scanning probability, but that metric assumes defenders are in the loop. If your inventory system is exposed and you found this through this note rather than a scanner, you're outside that loop. Prioritize network isolation or decommissioning rather than waiting for a fix that may never arrive.
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-76990 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data