CVE-2026-7715
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been found in ravenwits mcp-server-arangodb up to 0.4.7. This affects the function arango_backup of the file src/tools.ts of the component MCP Interface. Such manipulation of the argument outputDir leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA path traversal vulnerability exists in the arango_backup function within src/tools.ts of the MCP Interface component of mcp-server-arangodb. The outputDir argument is not properly validated, allowing attackers to manipulate file paths to access directories outside the intended scope.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if mcp-server-arangodb is installedRun 'npm list mcp-server-arangodb' or check your node_modules directory for the package, or look for the mcp-server-arangodb binary in your PATHAffected if The package is present in your environment
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Determine the installed versionRun 'npm list mcp-server-arangodb --depth=0' to see the installed version, or check package.json if you have the sourceAffected if The installed version lacks the path validation fix for the arango_backup outputDir parameter
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Locate the arango_backup function sourceFind the src/tools.ts file in the mcp-server-arangodb installation and locate the arango_backup function definitionAffected if The function exists and accepts an outputDir parameter without validation
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Inspect outputDir validation in the functionExamine the arango_backup function code for path sanitization - look for path.resolve(), path.isAbsolute(), or directory boundary checks before using outputDir in file operationsAffected if The outputDir argument is used directly in file operations without validation or sanitization checks
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Verify MCP exposure of the backup functionCheck your MCP server configuration or tool definitions to confirm the arango_backup function is exposed as an available toolAffected if The vulnerable arango_backup function is exposed via the MCP interface and reachable by clients
You are affected if mcp-server-arangodb is installed with the arango_backup function exposed and the outputDir parameter in src/tools.ts lacks path traversal validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation and path sanitization for the outputDir parameter to ensure it resolves to an allowed directory. Use path.resolve() and validate the final path is within expected boundaries before file operations.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7715 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7715 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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