CVE-2026-7786
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedJinan USR IOT Technology Limited (PUSR) USR-W610 RS232/485 to Wi-Fi/Ethernet Converter device firmware contains plaintext administrative credentials embedded in the firmware image. These credentials can be extracted through firmware analysis and used to authenticate to device services.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe USR-W610 Wi-Fi/Ethernet converter firmware contains hardcoded plaintext administrative credentials embedded directly in the firmware image. An attacker with access to the firmware file (through supply chain analysis, firmware download, or device extraction) can extract these credentials using standard binary analysis tools and use them to authenticate to the device's management services.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the physical device or check network inventory for USR-W610 converters. Confirm the device is a USR-W610 model by checking the device label, management interface, or SNMP/sysinfo response.Affected if The device is a USR-W610 converter.
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Determine firmware versionAccess the device web interface, CLI, or management API and retrieve the firmware version. This is typically found under System, Status, or Firmware Information pages.Affected if Firmware version cannot be verified or is unknown.
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Extract and analyze firmware imageObtain the firmware binary from the vendor website or device (via TFTP, HTTP download, or firmware backup feature if available). Use binwalk, strings, or a hex editor to search for plaintext credential patterns such as 'admin', 'root', 'user', or password strings within the binary.Affected if The firmware image contains embedded plaintext administrative usernames or passwords.
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Check for default credential usageAttempt authentication to the device management web interface or CLI using common default credentials (admin/admin, admin/password, root/root) or any credentials extracted from firmware analysis.Affected if Authentication succeeds with credentials found embedded in the firmware.
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Assess network exposure of management servicesScan the network for open ports on the device (typically HTTP/HTTPS on 80/443, or telnet/SSH). Determine if management interfaces are reachable from untrusted network segments.Affected if Device management services are accessible from networks that are not strictly controlled.
A defender is affected if they operate a USR-W610 device whose firmware contains hardcoded plaintext administrative credentials that are accessible or usable for authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately change default administrative credentials on all affected devices, contact the vendor for a patched firmware version that removes hardcoded credentials, and implement network segmentation to limit exposure of management interfaces.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7786 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7786 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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