CVE-2026-7795
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Click to Chat – WA Widget plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the [chat] shortcode 'num' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.38. This is due to insufficient escaping when embedding user-supplied shortcode attribute values inside JavaScript string literals that are then placed in HTML event-handler attributes. The CCW_Shortcode::shortcode() function applies esc_attr() to the 'num' parameter (line 157), which converts single quotes to the HTML entity '. This entity-encoded value is then interpolated directly into a JavaScript window.open() call string delimited by single quotes (line 194/221), and that complete string is placed verbatim into an HTML onclick attribute in the style template files (e.g., sc-style-1.php line 6). Because browsers HTML-decode event attribute values before executing the embedded JavaScript, the ' entities are decoded back to literal single quotes at runtime, allowing the injected payload to break out of the JavaScript string context and execute arbitrary code. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Contributor-level access and above to inject arbitrary web scripts into pages that will execute whenever a user clicks the WhatsApp chat button rendered by the [chat] shortcode.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Click to Chat – WA Widget plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the [chat] shortcode's 'num' parameter. The plugin uses esc_attr() which converts single quotes to the HTML entity ', then embeds this value directly into a JavaScript window.open() call string inside an onclick attribute. Since browsers decode HTML entities in event handlers before executing JavaScript, the ' entities become literal single quotes at runtime, allowing the payload to break out of the JavaScript string and execute arbitrary code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify plugin installation and versionCheck if the Click to Chat - WA Widget plugin is installed in WordPress (wp-content/plugins). Look for the plugin file or check via WordPress admin plugins page. Compare the installed version against any known affected versions if available.Affected if The plugin is installed and the version is vulnerable (if version info is available, compare to affected ranges).
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Identify use of [chat] shortcode with num parameterSearch the WordPress database (wp_posts table) or use a search tool to find content containing the [chat] shortcode with a 'num' attribute, for example: [chat num="..."] or [chat number="..."]Affected if Content exists that uses the [chat] shortcode with a 'num' parameter containing single quotes or that could accept user-supplied input.
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Examine the plugin shortcode handler codeLocate the plugin's shortcode handler function (likely in the main plugin PHP file). Look for the code that handles the 'num' parameter and outputs an onclick attribute. Check if esc_attr() is used to escape the num value before placing it inside single quotes in a JavaScript onclick handler.Affected if The plugin code uses esc_attr() to escape the num parameter value and places it inside single quotes in an onclick attribute without proper JavaScript escaping.
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Confirm the vulnerable output patternInspect the exact HTML output generated when the [chat] shortcode with a num parameter is rendered. Verify that the num value appears inside a single-quote-delimited string within an onclick attribute, for example: onclick="someFunc('VALUE')"Affected if The rendered HTML shows the num parameter value inside single quotes within an onclick attribute, making it exploitable via HTML entity decoding.
A user is affected if the Click to Chat - WA Widget plugin is installed, the [chat] shortcode with a num parameter is in use, and the plugin outputs the num value inside single quotes in an onclick attribute using esc_attr() instead of proper JavaScript escaping.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace esc_attr() with esc_js() when embedding the 'num' parameter (and similar user-supplied values) into JavaScript string contexts to properly escape for JavaScript execution, not just HTML attribute context.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7795 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- www.wordfence.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7795 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data