dbcve.org
SQL InjectionWeakness · CWE-89

CVE-2026-7797

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-05-28
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to time-based blind SQL Injection via the 'append_where_sql' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.11.8 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. The /appointments/bulk REST endpoint is reachable by unauthenticated attackers because its permission check accepts a public nonce that is embedded in the booking widget's frontend JavaScript (ssa.api.public_nonce) and visible to all site visitors; exploitation requires issuing the request as a PUT with an application/x-www-form-urlencoded body so that PHP's superglobals are not populated and the blocklist check silently passes.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Simply Schedule Appointments WordPress plugin has a time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability in the 'append_where_sql' parameter. The /appointments/bulk REST endpoint is reachable by unauthenticated attackers because it accepts a public nonce embedded in the booking widget's frontend JavaScript. Exploitation requires sending a PUT request with application/x-www-form-urlencoded body to bypass the blocklist check, allowing attackers to inject malicious SQL queries and extract sensitive data.

MitigationUpdate the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin to version 1.6.11.9 or later to patch the SQL injection vulnerability. As a temporary measure, consider disabling the plugin or using firewall rules to block unauthorized access to the /appointments/bulk REST endpoint.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if Simply Schedule Appointments plugin is installed
    Check the WordPress plugins directory or use wp-cli: 'wp plugin list --status=active --field=name' to list active plugins
    Affected if The Simply Schedule Appointments plugin appears in the active plugins list
  2. Determine the installed plugin version
    Check the plugin header in simply-schedule-appointments.php or use wp-cli: 'wp plugin get simply-schedule-appointments --field=version'
    Affected if The installed version is lower than 1.6.11.9 (the patched version)
  3. Verify the /appointments/bulk REST endpoint is accessible
    Send a test PUT request to /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments/bulk with Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded. If the server responds (rather than returning 401/403), the endpoint is exposed
    Affected if The endpoint returns a valid HTTP response without authentication errors, indicating it is publicly accessible
  4. Check if the plugin uses a public nonce in the booking widget
    Inspect the frontend JavaScript of any page with the booking widget (view page source or fetch the JS file) and look for a nonce variable that could be used to authenticate to the REST API
    Affected if A nonce value is exposed in the frontend JavaScript that can be used to authenticate to the /appointments/bulk endpoint
  5. Confirm the append_where_sql parameter is accepted
    Send a PUT request to /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments/bulk with Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded and include the append_where_sql parameter with a benign test value (e.g., '1=1'). Check if the parameter is processed without being blocklisted
    Affected if The append_where_sql parameter is accepted and processed by the endpoint, indicating the blocklist bypass is present

A user is affected if the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin is installed with a version lower than 1.6.11.9 and the /appointments/bulk REST endpoint is publicly accessible with the append_where_sql parameter vulnerable to injection.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Update the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin to version 1.6.11.9 or later to patch the SQL injection vulnerability. As a temporary measure, consider disabling the plugin or using firewall rules to block unauthorized access to the /appointments/bulk REST endpoint.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

Version 1.6.11.9 or later of the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin

  1. Backup your WordPress database and files before making any changes
  2. Navigate to Plugins > Installed Plugins in the WordPress admin dashboard
  3. Locate 'Simply Schedule Appointments' (Appointment Booking Calendar) plugin
  4. Click 'Update now' if an update is available, or manually upload version 1.6.11.9 or later from the WordPress plugin repository
  5. Verify the plugin updated successfully by checking the version number in the plugins list
  6. Test that appointments can still be created and the booking widget functions correctly

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,900
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7797 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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