CVE-2026-7811
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been found in 54yyyu code-mcp up to 4cfc4643541a110c906d93635b391bf7e357f4a8. The affected element is the function is_safe_path of the file src/code_mcp/server.py of the component MCP File Handler. Such manipulation leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product takes the approach of rolling releases to provide continious delivery. Therefore, version details for affected and updated releases are not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA path traversal vulnerability exists in the is_safe_path function within src/code_mcp/server.py of the MCP File Handler component. The function fails to properly validate or sanitize file paths, allowing attackers to use path traversal sequences (e.g., '../') to access files outside the intended directory boundaries.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the MCP File Handler componentSearch for src/code_mcp/server.py file in your installation directory. Check if the 'code_mcp' package or 'MCP File Handler' component is installed in your environment using: pip show code_mcp or find . -path '*/code_mcp/server.py'Affected if The file src/code_mcp/server.py exists and contains an is_safe_path function
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Verify the is_safe_path function implementationOpen src/code_mcp/server.py and locate the is_safe_path function. Examine whether it performs path canonicalization using os.path.realpath() or os.path.abspath() and validates the resolved path stays within the intended base directoryAffected if The is_safe_path function exists but lacks proper path canonicalization and prefix checking (e.g., no os.path.realpath() with base directory validation)
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Check for path traversal sequences in file access logicReview the is_safe_path function and any related file access code for use of '../' or '..\' sequences. Verify whether the code checks for or strips these sequences before path resolutionAffected if The function does not sanitize or block path traversal sequences like '../' before processing file paths
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Identify if file access allows arbitrary pathsSearch for functions that call is_safe_path and determine if user-supplied paths are passed to file operations (open, os.listdir, etc.) without additional validationAffected if File operations accept paths that are only validated by is_safe_path without further restrictions
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Confirm the MCP server exposes file handler endpointsCheck if the MCP server configuration enables file handler functionality. Look for routes or handlers that process file path requests from clientsAffected if The MCP server has active file handler endpoints that accept path parameters from untrusted sources
You are affected if the MCP File Handler component is installed with the vulnerable is_safe_path function that lacks proper path canonicalization and does not validate resolved paths remain within intended directories.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImplement strict path canonicalization in is_safe_path that resolves paths to absolute form and verifies the resolved path remains within the intended base directory. Consider using os.path.realpath() combined with prefix checking, or implement allowlist-based file access controls.
- Audit the current implementation of the is_safe_path function in src/code_mcp/server.py to identify the specific path traversal vulnerability
- Implement additional path normalization using os.path.realpath() to resolve symlinks and absolute paths
- Add validation to ensure the resolved path stays within an allowed base directory
- Consider using pathlib.Path with strict resolution to prevent directory escape sequences like ../
- Add checks for null bytes and other path injection techniques
- Restrict file operations to explicitly allowed directories using allowlist-based validation
- If the MCP File Handler is not required, consider disabling or restricting it until a vendor fix is available
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7811 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7811 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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