Improper Privilege ManagementWeakness · CWE-269

CVE-2026-8206

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-02
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Kirki – Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder & Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation via account takeover in all versions 6.0.0 to 6.0.6. This is due to the plugin accepting an arbitrary email address when a username is used in the password reset request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send a password reset link for any user registered on the site to their own email address.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Kirki WordPress plugin versions 6.0.0-6.0.6 fails to validate that the email address matches the username during password reset requests, allowing unauthenticated attackers to hijack the reset token by specifying their own email address while providing any valid username. This grants attackers a password reset link for the target user, enabling full account takeover.

MitigationUpdate the Kirki plugin to version 6.0.7 or later where this vulnerability is patched. If unable to update immediately, consider disabling the plugin or implementing additional server-side validation on password reset requests.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm Kirki plugin is installed
    Navigate to WordPress admin dashboard > Plugins > Installed Plugins and look for 'Kirki Customizer Framework' in the list. Alternatively, check the /wp-content/plugins/kirki/ directory exists on the server.
    Affected if The Kirki plugin is present in the WordPress installation
  2. Identify installed Kirki version
    In WordPress admin > Plugins > Installed Plugins, find Kirki and view the version number displayed below the plugin name. Alternatively, check the main plugin file header in /wp-content/plugins/kirki/ for the 'Version' comment.
    Affected if The version number is 6.0.0 through 6.0.6 inclusive
  3. Verify password reset endpoint accessibility
    Attempt to access the WordPress password reset page at /wp-login.php?action=rp or test the wpLostPassword endpoint. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to request a reset for any username.
    Affected if The password reset form is accessible without authentication and accepts a username parameter
  4. Confirm WordPress user accounts exist
    Check if there are user accounts configured in WordPress (Users > All Users). The attack requires a valid username to target.
    Affected if There is at least one user account with a known username in the WordPress installation

A WordPress site is affected if the Kirki plugin versions 6.0.0-6.0.6 are installed and active, and the password reset functionality is publicly accessible to unauthenticated users.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Update the Kirki plugin to version 6.0.7 or later where this vulnerability is patched. If unable to update immediately, consider disabling the plugin or implementing additional server-side validation on password reset requests.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation1.0 h
  • Testing1.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
4.0 hours of engineering $750
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-8206 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-8206 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data