CVE-2026-8450
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHTTP::Daemon versions before 6.17 for Perl allow OS command injection via send_file(). send_file() opens its string argument with Perl's 2-arg open(). The 2-arg form interprets magic prefixes: '| cmd' and 'cmd |' open a pipe to a subprocess, '> path' and '>> path' open the path for write or append. Untrusted input passed to send_file() can run OS commands at the daemon process UID. The read-pipe form ('cmd |') also leaks subprocess stdout into the HTTP response body. The write-mode forms can create or truncate files at attacker chosen paths.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHTTP::Daemon before 6.17 allows OS command injection via send_file() because it uses Perl's 2-arg open() which interprets magic prefixes like '| cmd', 'cmd |', '> path', and '>> path'. Attackers can execute arbitrary OS commands at the daemon's UID or write/truncate files at attacker-controlled paths.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify HTTP::Daemon installationRun 'perl -MHTTP::Daemon -e 'print $HTTP::Daemon::VERSION'' to get the installed versionAffected if The version is below 6.17 or the module cannot be found (indicating an older version may be bundled)
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Locate send_file() usage in codeSearch source code files for 'send_file(' patterns using grep or equivalent: grep -r 'send_file(' /path/to/code/Affected if The function send_file() is present in the codebase and processes input
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Inspect send_file() implementationCheck the HTTP::Daemon module file for the send_file() function definition and verify it uses 2-arg open() syntaxAffected if The function uses 2-argument open() rather than the safer 3-argument form
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Trace input sources to send_file()Review code paths where send_file() receives arguments; identify if any argument derives from user request, query parameters, headers, or external inputAffected if Untrusted or user-controlled input can reach the filename parameter of send_file()
You are affected if HTTP::Daemon version is below 6.17 AND your code calls send_file() with input that could contain the magic prefixes '|', '>', or '>>'.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade HTTP::Daemon to version 6.17 or later; if upgrade is not feasible, validate and sanitize all input passed to send_file() to reject magic characters (|, >, >>).
6.17
- Check current HTTP::Daemon version by running: cpan -D HTTP::Daemon or perl -MHTTP::Daemon -e 'print $HTTP::Daemon::VERSION'
- Upgrade to version 6.17 or later using: cpan HTTP::Daemon or cpanm HTTP::Daemon
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the new version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,168.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-8450 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-8450 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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