CVE-2026-8776
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been found in Edimax BR-6428NS 1.10. This vulnerability affects the function formPPTPSetup of the file /goform/formPPTPSetup of the component POST Request Handler. Such manipulation of the argument pptpUserName leads to buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBuffer overflow vulnerability in Edimax BR-6428NS router firmware 1.10 allows remote attackers to overflow the pptpUserName buffer in the formPPTPSetup function via the POST request handler at /goform/formPPTPSetup. This is a classic input validation failure leading to stack-based buffer overflow.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelCheck the router label or login to the web interface and look for the model number (typically displayed on the status page or in the system settings). Confirm it is Edimax BR-6428NS.Affected if The device is an Edimax BR-6428NS router.
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Determine the firmware versionIn the router web interface, navigate to the status or system information page and record the firmware version number displayed. Compare this version to the affected version 1.10.Affected if The installed firmware version is 1.10.
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Verify if PPTP functionality is configuredIn the router web interface, locate the PPTP settings (usually under Advanced or VPN settings). Check if a PPTP connection is configured or enabled, specifically looking for the pptpUserName field.Affected if PPTP is enabled and a username is configured in the PPTP settings.
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Check web interface network exposureDetermine if the router web interface (port 80 or 443) is accessible from the internet or an untrusted network by attempting to access the IP address externally or reviewing firewall rules.Affected if The router web interface is exposed to untrusted networks.
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Inspect POST requests to the vulnerable endpointIf you have access to logs or traffic captures, look for POST requests sent to /goform/formPPTPSetup with a pptpUserName parameter. This is the specific attack vector.Affected if POST requests to /goform/formPPTPSetup with large pptpUserName values have been logged or observed.
You are affected if you own an Edimax BR-6428NS router running firmware 1.10 with PPTP functionality enabled and the router web interface is network-accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince the vendor is non-responsive and no patch exists, immediately restrict network exposure to the router's web interface, disable PPTP functionality if possible, and strongly consider replacing the end-of-life device with a supported model.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-8776 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-8776 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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