OS Command InjectionWeakness · CWE-78

CVE-2026-8913

HIGH · 8.5 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-06-08
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
87/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A command Injection vulnerability exists in the WireGuard client configuration of Archer MR600 v5 due to improper neutralization of user-controlled input within the web management interface. An authenticated attacker with administrative privileges may be able to execute arbitrary commands when applying configuration changes.Successful exploitation may result in a full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected device.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A command injection vulnerability exists in the WireGuard client configuration functionality of TP-Link Archer MR600 v5 routers. The web management interface fails to properly sanitize user-controlled input when processing WireGuard configuration settings, allowing an authenticated administrator to inject and execute arbitrary OS commands on the device.

MitigationApply available firmware updates from TP-Link. Until a patch is released, restrict administrative web interface access to trusted IP addresses only and monitor for suspicious configuration changes. Consider network segmentation to limit exposure.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Adjacent
Complexity
Low
Privileges
High
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the router model
    Access the router's web interface or check the device label. Navigate to Status or System settings to view the device model and firmware version.
    Affected if The device is not a TP-Link Archer MR600 v5
  2. Verify web management interface accessibility
    Attempt to access the router's web interface at the default IP (typically 192.168.0.1 or 192.168.1.1) via HTTPS. Confirm the interface is reachable.
    Affected if The web management interface is exposed and accessible from untrusted networks (the vulnerability can be triggered by any authenticated admin)
  3. Confirm WireGuard client feature is present
    Log into the web management interface and navigate to Advanced or Network settings. Look for WireGuard, VPN, or client configuration sections.
    Affected if The router firmware includes WireGuard client configuration capabilities and this feature is accessible in the interface

You are affected if you own a TP-Link Archer MR600 v5 router with an accessible web management interface that includes WireGuard client configuration features, as the command injection flaw exists in how that configuration is processed.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply available firmware updates from TP-Link. Until a patch is released, restrict administrative web interface access to trusted IP addresses only and monitor for suspicious configuration changes. Consider network segmentation to limit exposure.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
30.0 hours of engineering $5,280
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-8913 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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