CVE-2026-9058
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFor untrusted certificates that contain the "Authority Information Access - caIssuers URI" extension, Szafir SDK will automatically download the parent CA certificate from the specified URL and will import it to its trust store as a "nonqualified" certificate. In such a case, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 ("Positively verified") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of "nonqualified". For other types of untrusted certificates, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 ("Positively verified") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of "nondetermined". This may lead integrating applications to incorrectly treat the digital signature as valid despite an untrusted certificate chain. This flaw enables authentication bypass and user impersonation: (1) in use-cases other than qualified certificate authentication, or (2) if the qualified certificate authentication use-case is not correctly implemented by the integrating application. This issue was fixed in version 1.8.463.2.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSzafir SDK automatically downloads and imports parent CA certificates from AIA caIssuers URIs for untrusted certificates, adding them to the trust store as 'nonqualified' certificates. The SDK then returns a success status code of 0 ('Positively verified') with a 'nonqualified' or 'nondetermined' status, allowing attackers to bypass authentication by leveraging improperly validated certificate chains.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Szafir SDK presenceSearch for Szafir SDK library files (e.g., szafir.dll, libszafir.so, szafir.jar, or equivalent) in application directories, dependencies, or package manifestsAffected if Szafir SDK files or dependencies are found in the environment
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Determine installed versionInspect the Szafir SDK library metadata, version file, or software bill of materials (SBOM) to identify the exact version numberAffected if Version is below 463 (e.g., 462, 400, 300, etc.) or version cannot be determined
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Verify signature verification code pathReview application source code or binary for calls to Szafir SDK signature verification functions that return verification status codesAffected if The application uses Szafir SDK verification APIs and relies on the returned status code without additional trust validation
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Check for certificateType validationSearch application code for logic that checks the 'certificateType' field or 'trustStatus' attribute in verification response objectsAffected if No validation exists for certificateType being 'nondetermined' before accepting verification results as trusted
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Inspect verification results for vulnerable responsesReview logs, audit trails, or captured API responses from signature verification to identify any instances where status='0' (success) coincides with certificateType='nondetermined'Affected if Any verification records show success status with nondetermined certificate trust status
A user is affected if Szafir SDK version is below 463 AND the application accepts verification results without checking that certificateType is not 'nondetermined'.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Szafir SDK to version 1.8.463.2 or later. Additionally, review integrating applications to ensure they properly validate certificate status and do not treat 'nonqualified' or 'nondetermined' certificates as valid for authentication purposes.
Szafir SDK version 463
- 1. Identify the current version of Szafir SDK deployed in your environment
- 2. Obtain Szafir SDK version 463 or later from the official vendor (Asseco or authorized distributor)
- 3. Review the vendor's upgrade documentation for version 463
- 4. Perform the upgrade following the vendor's recommended procedure
- 5. Verify that the signature verification now correctly returns a non-zero status code when certificate trust cannot be established (certificateType != 'nondetermined')
- 6. Test that consuming applications no longer incorrectly treat signatures as valid when certificate trust is undetermined
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing5.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,752.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-9058 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-9058 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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