CVE-2026-9098
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn Casdoor versions 2.362.0 and earlier, the SAML callback handler in controllers/auth.go accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest previously issued by Casdoor. Additionally, if an administrator disables or deletes an IdP (Identity Provider) after a SAML flow has started, the handler still processes the response using the provider snapshot loaded at the start of the request. As a result, an attacker controlling a registered upstream IdP can send unsolicited SAML responses, or replay a legitimately captured response in a different session or after the original flow has ended. In both cases, Casdoor accepts the response and issues a session, enabling persistent unauthorized access.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCasdoor's SAML callback handler at /api/acs accepts any valid SAMLResponse without validating the InResponseTo attribute against a previously issued AuthnRequest, and continues processing using a stale IdP snapshot even after the IdP is disabled/deleted, allowing attackers to inject unsolicited or replayed SAML responses to hijack sessions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check if SAML IdP is configuredNavigate to Casdoor's admin console and inspect the authentication methods. Look for any SAML Identity Provider (IdP) configurations under the authentication providers section.Affected if A SAML IdP is configured and enabled in Casdoor.
-
Verify Casdoor versionCheck the installed Casdoor version by examining the binary or container image tag, or by querying the /api/version endpoint if available.Affected if The installed version is any version of Casdoor that supports SAML (the vulnerability exists in the SAML callback handler).
-
Confirm /api/acs endpoint existsVerify the /api/acs endpoint is reachable in the Casdoor deployment by accessing it directly or reviewing the application's routing configuration.Affected if The /api/acs endpoint is present and exposed.
-
Check IdP state persistenceReview Casdoor's database or configuration storage to determine whether disabled or deleted IdP configurations are retained as snapshots that could be used for stale processing.Affected if IdP configurations remain in the system after being disabled or deleted.
A Casdoor instance is affected if it has SAML IdP authentication enabled and the /api/acs endpoint is accessible, regardless of IdP status, because the InResponseTo validation is missing and stale IdP snapshots are processed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement AuthnRequest tracking and InResponseTo validation to ensure responses are bound to legitimate requests, and add runtime IdP state verification before processing SAML responses.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,960.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-9098 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-9098 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data