dbcve.org
Missing AuthorizationWeakness · CWE-862

CVE-2026-9172

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-24
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Devs Accounting – Simple Accounting and Invoicing Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification/deletion of data due to a missing capability check on the delete_single_account() function in versions up to, and including, 1.2.0. The REST route 'devs-accounting/v1/delete-account/(?P<id>\d+)' is registered without any permission_callback, which causes WordPress to expose the endpoint to public, unauthenticated access. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to soft-delete arbitrary accounting account records (wp_dac_accounts) by issuing a simple GET request to the endpoint with any account ID.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

This WordPress plugin has a broken access control vulnerability where the REST endpoint 'devs-accounting/v1/delete-account/(?P<id>\d+)' lacks a permission_callback, causing WordPress to expose it to public/unauthenticated access. Attackers can soft-delete arbitrary accounting records (wp_dac_accounts) by sending a simple GET request with any account ID.

MitigationAdd a proper permission_callback to the REST route registration that verifies user capabilities (e.g., 'manage_options' or a custom capability) before executing delete_single_account(). Alternatively, change the endpoint to require authentication.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate the devs-accounting plugin files
    Navigate to wp-content/plugins/ in your WordPress installation and verify the devs-accounting folder exists. List the PHP files in that directory.
    Affected if The plugin folder and its main PHP file are present on the server.
  2. Identify the REST route registration
    In the plugin directory, search for the string 'delete-account' or 'register_rest_route' in PHP files, particularly in the main plugin file or any route registration file.
    Affected if A REST route matching 'devs-accounting/v1/delete-account/' is registered.
  3. Inspect the permission_callback for the delete-account endpoint
    Open the file containing the register_rest_route call for 'delete-account'. Locate the array argument that defines the endpoint methods (GET) and check if a 'permission_callback' key is defined with a capability check function.
    Affected if The endpoint registration has NO permission_callback defined, or permission_callback is set to '__return_true' or an empty/weak function that allows unauthenticated access.
  4. Verify the endpoint is publicly accessible
    Send a GET request to /wp-json/devs-accounting/v1/delete-account/1 from a browser or curl without any authentication headers. Check if the server returns a 200 OK response instead of 401/403.
    Affected if The endpoint responds with success (200) and processes the request without requiring authentication.
  5. Confirm the wp_dac_accounts table exists
    Access your WordPress database via phpMyAdmin or command line. Run SHOW TABLES LIKE 'wp_dac_accounts' (or check if the table prefix differs).
    Affected if The accounting accounts table exists and records can be soft-deleted via this endpoint.

If the devs-accounting plugin is installed and the delete-account REST endpoint lacks a permission_callback check, your site allows unauthenticated deletion of accounting records.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Add a proper permission_callback to the REST route registration that verifies user capabilities (e.g., 'manage_options' or a custom capability) before executing delete_single_account(). Alternatively, change the endpoint to require authentication.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation1.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
6.0 hours of engineering $1,060
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-9172 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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