CVE-2026-9178
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe WP Forms Connector plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.8. The plugin registers the REST route wp/v3/user/list/<id> (callback userDetail()) with permission_callback set to '__return_true', and the function's home-grown authentication only verifies that the supplied 'Username' HTTP header maps to an administrator account and that a 'Password' HTTP header is non-empty. It never validates the password with wp_check_password() (unlike the sibling delete_wc_user() function which does). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve sensitive information for any registered user ID — including the WordPress password hash (user_pass) and email address — by sending a request with a valid administrator login name (commonly the default 'admin') and any arbitrary password value.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe WP Forms Connector plugin for WordPress exposes a REST API endpoint (wp/v3/user/list/<id>) that uses a broken authentication mechanism. The userDetail() function only verifies that the supplied Username HTTP header corresponds to an administrator account and that the Password header is non-empty—it never validates the actual password using wp_check_password(). This allows unauthenticated attackers to retrieve sensitive user data including password hashes (user_pass) and email addresses by sending requests with any valid admin username (commonly 'admin') and arbitrary password value.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify WP Forms Connector plugin is installedCheck WordPress plugins directory or admin panel for 'WP Forms Connector' plugin presence. Look in wp-content/plugins/ for a folder named 'wp-forms-connector' or similar.Affected if The plugin is installed and active on the WordPress site.
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Identify the vulnerable REST API endpointLocate the plugin PHP files and search for the REST route definition containing 'user/list' or the userDetail() function that handles the /wp/v3/user/list/<id> endpoint.Affected if The plugin registers a REST API route at wp/v3/user/list/<id>.
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Inspect the authentication logic in userDetail() functionOpen the plugin file containing userDetail() and examine the code that handles the Username and Password HTTP headers. Look for wp_check_password() usage and the permission_callback implementation.Affected if The function only checks that the Username header matches an admin user and the Password header is non-empty, without calling wp_check_password() to validate the actual password.
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Test the endpoint for authentication bypassSend a GET request to /wp-json/wp/v3/user/list/<id> (where <id> is a user ID) with HTTP headers 'Username: admin' (or any valid admin username) and 'Password: anything' (any non-empty value). Observe if the response contains user data including user_pass hashes and email addresses.Affected if The request returns sensitive user data (user_pass, email) without requiring valid password authentication.
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Check if user data is exposedExamine the REST API response payload to confirm it includes the user_pass field (WordPress password hash) and email address for the requested user.Affected if The API response exposes password hashes (user_pass field) or email addresses to unauthenticated requests.
A site is affected if the WP Forms Connector plugin is installed, registers the wp/v3/user/list/<id> endpoint, and returns sensitive user data when supplied with any admin username and arbitrary non-empty password without validating the password via wp_check_password().
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable or remove the WP Forms Connector plugin until a patched version is available. If continued use is required, implement proper password validation using WordPress's wp_check_password() function and replace the '__return_true' permission_callback with appropriate capability checks.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-9178 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-9178 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data