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Authorization Bypass (IDOR)Weakness · CWE-639

CVE-2026-9180

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-03
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click 7 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.4. This is due to the `POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings` REST endpoint being registered with `'permission_callback' => '__return_true'`, allowing unauthenticated access, while the `createBooking` handler in `BookingsRestController.php` accepts an attacker-supplied `payment_details.booking_id` value and loads the referenced booking via `findById()` without verifying that the caller owns or has any rights to that booking. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the customer name, email address, phone number, and `customer_id` of any non-confirmed victim booking by submitting a request with no reservation items, causing `BookingService::createBooking()` to load the existing victim booking object and persist it with attacker-controlled customer data. Victim booking IDs can be harvested prior to exploitation without authentication by querying the also-publicly-accessible `GET /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings/reservations` endpoint with a guessable `service_id` and date range, and only bookings whose status is not `STATUS_CONFIRMED` (e.g., pending or auto-draft) are valid targets.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin registers a REST endpoint at POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings with a permissive permission_callback that allows unauthenticated access. The createBooking handler accepts a payment_details.booking_id parameter and loads the referenced booking without verifying caller ownership, enabling unauthenticated attackers to modify customer data (name, email, phone, customer_id) on any non-confirmed booking.

MitigationUpdate to a patched version of the plugin once available, and ensure the REST endpoint implements proper authentication and authorization checks to verify ownership before allowing booking modifications.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm plugin installation
    Check if the MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin is installed in your WordPress site by reviewing the plugins list in wp-admin or checking the file system for /wp-content/plugins/motopress-appointment-booking/
    Affected if The plugin is installed and active
  2. Identify installed plugin version
    Locate the plugin header in the main plugin file (e.g., motopress-appointment-booking.php) and read the Version: field, or check the WordPress plugin admin page for the installed version number
    Affected if Version cannot be determined or is lower than the patched version when released
  3. Verify REST endpoint exists
    Send a GET request to /wp-json/motopress/appointment/v1/ to confirm the REST namespace is registered, then verify the /bookings endpoint accepts POST requests
    Affected if The REST endpoint /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings is exposed and accepts requests
  4. Test unauthenticated access to booking modification
    Send a POST request to /wp-json/motopress/appointment/v1/bookings with a payment_details.booking_id parameter containing a valid but unconfirmed booking ID, without including authentication headers
    Affected if The request succeeds and returns booking data or allows modification without authentication
  5. Confirm booking modification without ownership check
    Submit a modification request to the endpoint with a booking_id for a non-confirmed booking that does not belong to the requester, and observe whether the customer fields (name, email, phone, customer_id) are modified without ownership verification
    Affected if Customer data on arbitrary non-confirmed bookings can be modified without proving ownership

Your environment is affected if the MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin is installed, the REST endpoint /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings accepts unauthenticated POST requests, and booking data can be modified without ownership verification.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Update to a patched version of the plugin once available, and ensure the REST endpoint implements proper authentication and authorization checks to verify ownership before allowing booking modifications.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin version > 2.4.4 (latest stable release)

  1. Navigate to the WordPress admin dashboard and go to Plugins > Installed Plugins
  2. Locate the MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin
  3. Check the current installed version (should be 2.4.4 or below)
  4. Update the plugin to the latest available version from the WordPress plugin repository
  5. Verify the update was successful and the new version is installed

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,750
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-9180 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data