Incorrect Permission AssignmentWeakness · CWE-732

CVE-2026-9508

CRITICAL · 10.0 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-05-29
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Incorrect permission settings on a critical resource in Suprema BioStar 2 (versions 2.9.3 through 2.9.11) that allow backup files to be publicly exposed when the administrator configures their path within the NGINX webroot. This vulnerability allows an attacker with network access to directly download backup ZIP files via ‘http(s)://[server]/download/…’ without requiring authentication. This exposes highly sensitive information that can lead to server impersonation, unauthorized access to databases, and lateral movement.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Suprema BioStar 2 versions 2.9.3-2.9.11 has an insecure direct object reference vulnerability where backup ZIP files stored in the NGINX webroot are accessible without authentication via the /download/ path. Attackers can directly request these files over HTTP/HTTPS to obtain sensitive system backups containing credentials, configurations, and database data.

MitigationRestrict access to backup files by moving them outside the NGINX webroot directory, implementing proper file permissions (restrictive ownership and read access), and configuring NGINX to deny direct access to the /download/ path for unauthenticated users.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify BioStar 2 installation and version
    Locate the BioStar 2 installation directory and check the version information, typically found in the application properties, about page, or installation logs
    Affected if Installed version falls within 2.9.3 to 2.9.11 inclusive
  2. Verify HTTP/HTTPS access to /download/ endpoint
    Attempt to access the /download/ path on the BioStar 2 server via HTTP or HTTPS using a web browser or curl command
    Affected if The /download/ directory is accessible without requiring authentication
  3. Enumerate backup ZIP files in webroot
    List or download any .zip files found at the /download/ endpoint, which may include backup archives with names like backup_*.zip or similar
    Affected if Backup ZIP files are present and downloadable without authentication
  4. Check NGINX configuration for /download/ location
    Examine the NGINX server configuration file to confirm the /download/ path is mapped to the webroot and returns files without authentication checks
    Affected if NGINX serves /download/ without requiring authentication or authorization

A user is affected if BioStar 2 version 2.9.3-2.9.11 is running and the /download/ endpoint is exposed without authentication, allowing anonymous access to backup ZIP files.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Restrict access to backup files by moving them outside the NGINX webroot directory, implementing proper file permissions (restrictive ownership and read access), and configuring NGINX to deny direct access to the /download/ path for unauthenticated users.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,420
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-9508 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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