CVE-1999-0582
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA Windows NT account policy has inappropriate, security-critical settings for lockout, e.g. lockout duration, lockout after bad logon attempts, etc.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceWindows NT account lockout policies are configured with insecure settings, specifically the lockout threshold (number of failed attempts before lockout) and lockout duration are set too permissively or disabled. This allows attackers to conduct brute force password attacks without accounts being locked, making credential guessing feasible.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if account lockout policy is definedOpen Local Security Policy (secpol.msc) and navigate to Account Policies > Account Lockout Policy, or run 'net accounts' from command prompt and look for lockout settingsAffected if No lockout policy is listed or 'Account lockout threshold' shows '0' (meaning disabled)
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Verify the lockout threshold valueIn the same Account Lockout Policy section, check the 'Account lockout threshold' setting. From command line, 'net accounts' displays this as the number of failed logon attempts allowedAffected if Threshold is set to 0 (disabled) or a high number (greater than 10 failed attempts allowed)
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Check the lockout durationIn Account Lockout Policy, verify 'Account lockout duration' setting. From command line, 'net accounts' shows this as minutes until lockout resetsAffected if Duration is set to 0 (meaning administrator must manually unlock) or is excessively long (over 60 minutes)
If the account lockout threshold is disabled (set to 0) or set to a high value allowing many failed attempts, the system is vulnerable to brute force password attacks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataConfigure Windows NT account lockout policy to enforce account lockout after a reasonable number of failed logon attempts (recommended: 3-5 attempts) with an appropriate lockout duration (15-30 minutes) to mitigate brute force attacks.
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- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-1999-0582 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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