CVE-2000-0796
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBuffer overflow in dmplay in IRIX 6.2 and 6.3 allows local users to gain root privileges via a long command line option.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the dmplay media player binary on IRIX 6.2 and 6.3 systems. By supplying an overly long command line argument, a local attacker can overwrite stack memory and execute arbitrary code with root privileges, achieving full system compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.2= 6.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify IRIX versionRun 'uname -r' or 'cat /etc/version' to confirm the installed IRIX version is 6.2 or 6.3Affected if The system runs IRIX 6.2 or 6.3 exactly
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Locate dmplay binaryRun 'which dmplay' or 'find /usr -name dmplay -type f 2>/dev/null' to find the dmplay binaryAffected if The dmplay binary exists on the system
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Check binary permissionsRun 'ls -la /path/to/dmplay' (use path from previous step) to examine ownership and permissionsAffected if The binary is owned by root and has world-executable or setuid permissions
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Verify binary is setuid rootRun 'ls -la /path/to/dmplay | grep '^-..s' to check for setuid bitAffected if The dmplay binary has the setuid bit set and is owned by root
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Assess user accessCheck which users or groups can execute dmplay by reviewing file permissions and comparing against untrusted user accountsAffected if Untrusted or non-admin users have execute access to the setuid dmplay binary
A user is affected if they run IRIX 6.2 or 6.3 and the dmplay binary exists with root ownership and setuid permissions accessible to untrusted users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply available Silicon Graphics patches for IRIX; if patches are unavailable, remove or rename the dmplay binary, or restrict execution to trusted users only.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2000-0796 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2000-0796 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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