12000 RouterHardware / appliance · Cisco

CVE-2001-0862

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v2.0 Published 2001-12-06
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Cisco 12000 with IOS 12.0 and line cards based on Engine 2 does not block non-initial packet fragments, which allows remote attackers to bypass the ACL.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Cisco 12000 series routers with IOS 12.0 and Engine 2 line cards fail to apply Access Control List (ACL) rules to non-initial IP packet fragments. Only the first fragment of a fragmented packet is checked against ACLs, while subsequent fragments are permitted regardless of the ACL rules, enabling attackers to bypass firewall restrictions by sending malicious payloads in fragment packets.

MitigationUpgrade to a patched IOS version that properly filters all packet fragments and configure explicit fragment handling policies in ACLs.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
12000 RouterHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the router model
    Use the 'show version' or 'show hardware' command to confirm the device is a Cisco 12000 series router
    Affected if The device is not a Cisco 12000 series router, then it is not affected by this specific CVE
  2. Check the IOS version
    Execute 'show version' and look for the IOS version number in the 12.0 family (e.g., 12.0, 12.0S, 12.0ST, etc.)
    Affected if The IOS version is not in the 12.0 family, the device may not be affected by this specific vulnerability
  3. Verify Engine 2 line cards are present
    Use 'show version' or 'show diag' to identify the line card engine types installed in the router
    Affected if No Engine 2 line cards are present, the device is likely not affected by this vulnerability
  4. Check for configured ACLs
    Use 'show ip access-lists' to list all configured IP access control lists on the router
    Affected if No ACLs are configured, the fragment bypass vulnerability cannot be exploited
  5. Verify ACL application to interfaces
    Use 'show ip interface' on relevant interfaces to confirm ACLs are applied to inbound or outbound traffic
    Affected if No ACLs are applied to any interface, the vulnerability cannot be exploited regardless of fragment handling
  6. Inspect fragment handling configuration
    Review ACL entries for 'fragments' keywords or use 'show running-config | include fragment' to check explicit fragment policies
    Affected if ACLs lack explicit fragment handling rules (no 'fragment' keyword or 'deny fragment' statements), non-initial fragments can bypass the ACL filters

The environment is affected if it is a Cisco 12000 series router running IOS 12.0 with Engine 2 line cards and has ACLs applied to interfaces without explicit fragment handling rules.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched IOS version that properly filters all packet fragments and configure explicit fragment handling policies in ACLs.

Fix this in 12000 Router Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
12.0 hours of engineering $2,130
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2001-0862 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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