Voip Phone Cp 7940Hardware / appliance · Cisco
CVE-2002-0880
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco IP Phone (VoIP) models 7910, 7940, and 7960 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via malformed packets as demonstrated by (1) "jolt", (2) "jolt2", (3) "raped", (4) "hping2", (5) "bloop", (6) "bubonic", (7) "mutant", (8) "trash", and (9) "trash2."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis CVE affects Cisco IP Phone models 7910, 7940, and 7960 from 2002. Remote attackers can crash these VoIP devices by sending malformed packets using various network stress-testing tools (jolt, jolt2, hping2, etc.), resulting in denial of service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Voip Phone Cp 7940Hardware / appliance
= 3.0= 3.1= 3.2
Skinny Client Control Protocol SoftwareOperating system
= 3.0= 3.1= 3.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco IP Phone models on the networkInventory network devices to find any Cisco IP Phone 7910, 7940, or 7960 devices still connected. Check DHCP logs, network scans, or phone system inventories for these model numbers.Affected if Any Cisco IP Phone model 7910, 7940, or 7960 is found on the network
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Check the firmware or SCCP software versionAccess the phone administration interface or consult your Call Manager/VoIP infrastructure to determine the installed firmware version. For direct phone access, use the phone keypad to navigate to Settings > Status > Firmware Version or equivalent.Affected if The firmware version is 3.0, 3.1, or 3.2 on a Cisco 7940 or 7960, or the Skinny Client Control Protocol Software version is 3.0, 3.1, or 3.2
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Verify phones are actively connected and reachablePing the IP addresses assigned to these phone devices or check if they are registered with your VoIP call manager (such as Cisco CallManager, CUCM, or third-party SIP proxy).Affected if The affected phone models are powered on and connected to the network with an active IP address
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Assess network exposure of legacy phonesReview firewall rules and network ACLs to determine whether these phones are accessible from untrusted networks or external interfaces. Check if they accept traffic from any source on the SCCP port (typically TCP 2000) or VoIP ports.Affected if The phones are reachable from network segments outside the trusted internal network or from untrusted hosts
You are affected if you have any Cisco IP Phone 7910, 7940, or 7960 devices running firmware or SCCP software versions 3.0, 3.1, or 3.2 that are still connected and reachable on your network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataNetwork segmentation and firewall rules to filter or block malformed packets can mitigate this vulnerability. However, these are legacy devices from 2002 with likely no vendor patches available, so upgrading to supported phone hardware is the recommended long-term solution.
Fix this in Voip Phone Cp 7940
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2002-0880 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2002-0880 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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