Voip Phone Cp 7940Hardware / appliance · Cisco

CVE-2002-0882

MEDIUM · 6.4 CVSS v2.0 Published 2002-10-04
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
73/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The web server for Cisco IP Phone (VoIP) models 7910, 7940, and 7960 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reset) and possibly read sensitive memory via a large integer value in (1) the stream ID of the StreamingStatistics script, or (2) the port ID of the PortInformation script.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

The embedded web server in Cisco IP Phone models 7910, 7940, and 7960 fails to properly validate large integer values in HTTP request parameters. Specifically, the stream ID parameter in the StreamingStatistics script and the port ID parameter in the PortInformation script accept oversized values that cause the device to reset (denial of service) and may allow attackers to read sensitive memory contents from adjacent memory locations.

MitigationRestrict network access to the phone management interfaces using ACLs or network segmentation. Due to the age of these devices (2002 vulnerability), strongly consider replacing them with current models as no patches are expected. If continued use is mandatory, isolate these phones in a dedicated VLAN with strict firewall rules.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Voip Phone Cp 7940Hardware / appliance
Affected:= 3.0= 3.1= 3.2
Skinny Client Control Protocol SoftwareOperating system
Affected:= 3.0= 3.1= 3.2

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
None
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the Cisco IP Phone model
    Check the device label, CDP neighbors, or DHCP options to confirm the model is 7910, 7940, or 7960
    Affected if The device is a Cisco IP Phone 7910, 7940, or 7960
  2. Check the firmware version
    Access the phone's web interface or use TFTP to retrieve the firmware version file; compare against 3.0, 3.1, or 3.2
    Affected if The firmware version is 3.0, 3.1, or 3.2
  3. Verify the embedded HTTP web server is enabled
    Attempt to access the phone's web interface via HTTP on port 80 or the configured management port
    Affected if The HTTP service responds and displays the phone's management page
  4. Confirm access to vulnerable scripts
    Attempt HTTP requests to /StreamingStatistics and /PortInformation endpoints on the phone's web server
    Affected if These scripts are accessible and accept integer parameters without validation

You are affected if you have a Cisco IP Phone 7910, 7940, or 7960 running firmware version 3.0, 3.1, or 3.2 with the embedded HTTP web server enabled and accessible.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Restrict network access to the phone management interfaces using ACLs or network segmentation. Due to the age of these devices (2002 vulnerability), strongly consider replacing them with current models as no patches are expected. If continued use is mandatory, isolate these phones in a dedicated VLAN with strict firewall rules.

Fix this in Voip Phone Cp 7940 Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,200
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2002-0882 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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