CVE-2002-1691
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAlcatel OmniPCX 4400 installs known user accounts and passwords in the /etc/password file by default, which allows remote attackers to gain unauthorized access.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Alcatel OmniPCX 4400 PBX system ships with pre-configured default user accounts with known/standard passwords stored in the system password file. Remote attackers can exploit these default credentials to gain unauthorized administrative access to the PBX system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4400CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the system versionAccess the PBX administration interface or system console and determine the exact model and firmware version. Look for 'OmniPCX 4400' or similar Alcatel Lucent PBX identifiers in the system information or about section.Affected if The system is an Alcatel OmniPCX 4400 running any version
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Locate the user account managementAccess the PBX administrative interface (typically via web browser on the management IP, or through the system console/Telnet/SSH). Navigate to the user management, accounts, or system users section where local accounts are configured.Affected if You can access user account configuration and see a list of defined accounts
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Enumerate all defined user accountsList all user accounts configured on the system, paying particular attention to accounts with administrative or privileged access levels. Note the usernames and their enabled/disabled status.Affected if Default accounts that ship with the system are present and listed
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Verify default account statusCheck whether any of the listed accounts appear to be factory default accounts (often named 'admin', 'root', 'supervisor', 'manager', or similar standard default usernames for PBX systems). Determine if these accounts are currently enabled and active.Affected if Default accounts exist and are enabled or active on the system
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Test for default password susceptibilityAttempt to authenticate using known default credentials for the OmniPCX 4400, or compare the system's stored password hashes/file against known default password values for this platform. Document whether authentication succeeds with default credentials.Affected if Authentication succeeds with default or standard passwords, or password hashes match known default values
You are affected if your system is an Alcatel OmniPCX 4400 and any default accounts shipped with the system remain enabled and accessible using standard/default passwords.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately change or disable all default accounts, implement strong unique passwords for any retained accounts, and consider replacing this legacy end-of-life system if vendor support is unavailable.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,304.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2002-1691 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2002-1691 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data