CVE-2007-5361
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Communication Server in Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Enterprise 7.1 and earlier caches an IP address during a TFTP request from an IP Touch phone, and uses this IP address as the destination for all subsequent VoIP packets to this phone, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of audio) or intercept voice communications via a crafted TFTP request containing the phone's MAC address in the filename.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Communication Server in Alcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Enterprise 7.1 and earlier improperly caches the source IP address from TFTP requests (which include the phone's MAC address in the filename) and uses this cached IP as the destination for all subsequent VoIP packets to that phone. Remote attackers can exploit this by sending crafted TFTP requests to hijack the VoIP traffic destination, causing audio loss or enabling traffic interception.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 7.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify OmniPCX Enterprise versionLocate the Communication Server installation and check its software version. This is typically found in the system administration interface, system information panel, or by running the vendor-specific version command. Compare the installed version against the affected range: version 7.1 and earlier.Affected if The installed version is OmniPCX Enterprise 7.1 or any version numbered lower than 7.1.
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Verify TFTP service is enabledCheck if the TFTP service is running on the Communication Server. On the server, verify that TFTP daemon/process is active and listening on UDP port 69. This can be done by checking running services, listening ports, or reviewing the server configuration for TFTP provisioning settings.Affected if TFTP service is enabled and actively handling phone provisioning requests.
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Confirm VoIP phone provisioning uses TFTPExamine the phone provisioning configuration to confirm that TFTP is used to deliver configuration files to IP phones. Look for MAC-address-based filenames in TFTP transfers or check the provisioning workflow that includes TFTP as the transport mechanism.Affected if VoIP phones are provisioned via TFTP with MAC address filenames, which is the condition the vulnerability exploits.
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Assess network exposure of TFTP portReview network firewall rules and access controls to determine if UDP port 69 (TFTP) is accessible from outside the trusted VoIP network segment. Check if the TFTP service accepts requests from untrusted or external network segments.Affected if TFTP port 69 is reachable from untrusted networks, allowing remote attackers to send crafted TFTP requests.
Your environment is affected if you run OmniPCX Enterprise version 7.1 or earlier with TFTP-based phone provisioning enabled and TFTP is accessible from networks where remote attackers could send malicious requests.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement network segmentation to isolate VoIP infrastructure, filter/block unauthorized TFTP traffic at network borders, and apply any available vendor patches or firmware updates for OmniPCX Enterprise.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-5361 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-5361 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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