CVE-2003-0722
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe default installation of sadmind on Solaris uses weak authentication (AUTH_SYS), which allows local and remote attackers to spoof Solstice AdminSuite clients and gain root privileges via a certain sequence of RPC packets.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe sadmind daemon on Solaris, used for Solstice AdminSuite remote administration, uses weak AUTH_SYS authentication by default. Attackers can craft malicious RPC packets to spoof legitimate admin clients and execute commands with root privileges on the target system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify if sadmind daemon is runningRun 'ps -ef | grep sadmind' or 'rpcinfo -p | grep sadmind' to check if the sadmind service is active on the systemAffected if The sadmind process appears in the process list or RPC services, indicating the vulnerable service is enabled
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Check sadmind configuration for authentication settingsExamine the sadmind configuration file typically located at /etc/sadminkp.conf or /etc/default/sadmind for authentication parametersAffected if AUTH_SYS (weak authentication) is configured as the default or only authentication method
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Verify RPC service registrationRun 'rpcinfo -s | grep -i sadmind' to confirm sadmind is registered as an RPC service on port 111Affected if The sadmind RPC service is registered and accessible, making it exploitable over the network
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Check network exposure of RPC servicesReview firewall rules or run 'netstat -an | grep 111' to determine if port 111 (sunrpc) is exposed to untrusted networksAffected if The RPC portmapper and sadmind service are reachable from untrusted network segments
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Confirm Solstice AdminSuite installationCheck for the presence of Solstice AdminSuite components via 'pkginfo | grep -i sunw' or by locating /usr/sbin/sadmind binaryAffected if The sadmind binary exists and the Solstice AdminSuite is installed on the system
The system is affected if the sadmind daemon is running with AUTH_SYS authentication enabled and is accessible over the network, allowing remote attackers to spoof RPC calls and execute commands as root.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedDisable the sadmind service if not required, or restrict access via firewall rules. If needed, implement stronger authentication mechanisms and apply vendor patches for this vulnerability.
Oracle Solaris 10 or 11, depending on deployment timeline and compatibility requirements
- Disable the sadmind daemon if not needed: svcadm disable svc:/network/rpc/sadmind:default
- If sadmind is required, restrict access by configuring RPC firewalling or TCP wrappers to limit which hosts can connect to port 111
- Apply Sun patches for this vulnerability - check SunSolve for patches 112963-05, 114361-03, or subsequent patches
- Consider upgrading to a modern Solaris/Oracle Solaris version that has this vulnerability addressed
- Verify the configuration after applying changes
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2003-0722 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2003-0722 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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