CVE-2005-0113
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedinpview in SGI IRIX allows local users to execute arbitrary commands via the SUN_TTSESSION_CMD environment variable, which is executed by inpview without dropping privileges.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe inpview utility in SGI IRIX contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability where the SUN_TTSESSION_CMD environment variable is executed without proper sanitization or privilege dropping. Since inpview runs with elevated (root) privileges, a local attacker can inject arbitrary commands through this environment variable to execute code with root privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the inpview binarySearch for the inpview executable in common IRIX binary directories such as /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, or by using 'which inpview' or 'find /usr -name inpview -type f 2>/dev/null'Affected if The inpview binary is found on the system
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Check setuid permissions on inpviewRun 'ls -l /path/to/inpview' (replace with the actual path found in step 1) and look for 's' in the owner execute field (e.g., '-rwsr-xr-x'), or use 'ls -la' to see all permissionsAffected if The inpview binary has the setuid bit set (permissions show 's' in owner execute and ownership is root)
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Verify binary ownershipExamine the ownership column from the 'ls -l' output - the user and group columns should show 'root' or similar administrative ownershipAffected if The inpview binary is owned by root or another privileged user account
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Confirm IRIX versionRun 'uname -a' or 'uname -r' to display the system version, or check '/etc/issue' if presentAffected if The system is running SGI IRIX version 6.5
The environment is affected if the inpview binary exists, is owned by root, and has the setuid bit set in its permissions, allowing any local user to potentially execute arbitrary commands with root privileges via the SUN_TTSESSION_CMD environment variable.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemove the setuid bit from the inpview binary if present, or remove the binary entirely if unnecessary. If the binary is required, restrict execute permissions to trusted users only or apply any available vendor patches for IRIX.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2005-0113 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2005-0113 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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