CVE-2005-1837
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFortinet firewall running FortiOS 2.x contains a hardcoded username with the password set to the serial number, which allows local users with console access to gain privileges.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceFortinet FortiOS 2.x contains a hardcoded default account where the password is set to the device's serial number, allowing anyone with console access to authenticate as an administrator without knowing the actual credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify FortiOS versionRun 'get system status' or 'show system version' via console or CLI to display the running FortiOS versionAffected if The version displayed is FortiOS 2.x (any minor version)
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Locate the device serial numberRun 'get system info' or 'show system info' via console/CLI to display the device serial numberAffected if Serial number is retrievable via CLI - this confirms the value that could be used as the default password
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Check for default administrator accountRun 'show system admin' or 'get system admin' via console/CLI to list all administrative accountsAffected if A default administrator account exists with no password configured or with password set to the serial number
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Assess console access exposureReview physical access controls and console/Telnet access configuration; check 'get system console' settingsAffected if Console or Telnet access is enabled without sufficient IP restriction or physical security
You are affected if running FortiOS 2.x and console/Telnet access is available, since the default account password equals the device serial number.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a supported FortiOS version and audit/disable any default accounts; restrict physical and console access to trusted personnel only.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,376.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2005-1837 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2005-1837 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data