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Vpn 3001 ConcentratorHardware / appliance · Cisco

CVE-2005-4499

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v2.0 Published 2005-12-22
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Downloadable RADIUS ACLs feature in Cisco PIX and VPN 3000 concentrators, when creating an ACL on the Cisco Secure Access Control Server (CS ACS), generates a random internal name for an ACL that is also used as a hidden user name and password, which allows remote attackers to gain privileges by sniffing the username from the cleartext portion of a RADIUS session, then using the password to log in to another device that uses CS ACS.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

When using Downloadable RADIUS ACLs on Cisco PIX and VPN 3000 concentrators with Cisco Secure Access Control Server (CS ACS), the system generates a random internal name for an ACL that is simultaneously used as a hidden username and password. This credential is transmitted in cleartext during RADIUS communication, allowing remote attackers to sniff the username and password from the network traffic and use them to authenticate to other CS ACS-integrated devices.

MitigationUpgrade affected Cisco PIX and VPN 3000 concentrator software to versions that address this vulnerability. Additionally, encrypt RADIUS traffic using IPsec or migrate to RadSec to prevent credential sniffing.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Vpn 3001 ConcentratorHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Vpn 3015 ConcentratorHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Vpn 3020 ConcentratorHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Vpn 3030 ConcentatorHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions= 4.7.1= 4.7.1.f
Vpn 3060 ConcentratorHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Vpn 3080 ConcentratorHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Adaptive Security Appliance SoftwareOperating system
Affected:= 7.0= 7.0\(4\)= 7.0.1.4= 7.0.4.3
Vpn 3000 Concentrator Series SoftwareOperating system
Affected:= 2.0= 2.5.2.a= 2.5.2.b= 2.5.2.c= 2.5.2.d= 2.5.2.f= 3.0= 3.0.3.a= 3.0.3.b= 3.0.4= 3.1= 3.1\(rel\)

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify Downloadable RADIUS ACL feature is in use
    Confirm the device is configured to use Downloadable RADIUS ACLs with Cisco Secure Access Control Server (CS ACS). This is typically found in the RADIUS authentication configuration on the Cisco device.
    Affected if The device uses Downloadable RADIUS ACLs with CS ACS integration, enabling the vulnerable credential generation mechanism.
  2. Identify the device model and software version
    Retrieve the device model (VPN 3000 Concentrator series or ASA) and the exact software version running on the device.
    Affected if The device is a Cisco VPN 3001, 3015, 3020, 3030, 3060, or 3080 Concentrator running any version; or an ASA running 7.0, 7.0(4), 7.0.1.4, or 7.0.4.3; or a VPN 3000 Concentrator running any of the listed affected versions.
  3. Inspect RADIUS communication for cleartext transmission
    Capture and analyze network traffic between the Cisco device and the CS ACS server. Look for RADIUS Access-Request or Access-Accept packets containing the ACL authorization credentials.
    Affected if RADIUS packets between the device and CS ACS are transmitted in cleartext without IPsec encryption, allowing the hidden username/password to be sniffed from the network.
  4. Check if RADIUS traffic is protected by encryption
    Verify whether IPsec or RadSec is configured to encrypt RADIUS communications between the Cisco device and CS ACS server.
    Affected if RADIUS traffic is not encrypted (no IPsec tunnel or RadSec configured), leaving the credential vulnerable to network sniffing.

The environment is affected if a Cisco PIX, ASA, or VPN 3000 Concentrator is configured to use Downloadable RADIUS ACLs with CS ACS, runs an affected software version, and communicates with the ACS server over unencrypted RADIUS, allowing the randomly generated credential to be captured from network traffic.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade affected Cisco PIX and VPN 3000 concentrator software to versions that address this vulnerability. Additionally, encrypt RADIUS traffic using IPsec or migrate to RadSec to prevent credential sniffing.

Fix this in Vpn 3001 Concentrator Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
36.0 hours of engineering $6,400
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2005-4499 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data