TeredoApplication · Microsoft

CVE-2006-6263

MEDIUM · 6.8 CVSS v2.0 Published 2006-12-04
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
77/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Teredo clients, when source routing is enabled, recognize a Routing header in an encapsulated IPv6 packet and send the packet to the next hop, which might allow remote attackers to bypass policies of certain Internet gateways that drop all source-routed packets.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

This vulnerability affects Teredo clients when source routing is enabled. The Teredo client will recognize and process a Routing header within an encapsulated IPv6 packet, forwarding it to the next hop rather than treating it as a dropped source-routed packet, allowing attackers to bypass Internet gateway policies that block source-routed traffic.

MitigationDisable source routing functionality on Teredo clients, or configure network firewalls and edge devices to explicitly drop all packets containing IPv6 Routing headers regardless of encapsulation.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
TeredoApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
M
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check if Teredo client is enabled
    Run 'netsh interface teredo show state' to see Teredo status. Also check 'netsh interface ipv6 show teredo' on older Windows versions.
    Affected if Teredo shows as 'Enabled' or 'Client' rather than 'Disabled' or 'Offline'
  2. Verify source routing is permitted on the system
    Run 'netsh interface ipv6 show route' to view routing table. Check registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip6\Parameters\DisableIPSourceRouting (if it exists and is set to 0 or 1, source routing is enabled).
    Affected if DisableIPSourceRouting is set to 0 (enabled) or 1 (enabled with loopback), or no restriction is configured
  3. Confirm Teredo interface is active
    Run 'ipconfig /all' and look for 'Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface' with an IPv6 address assigned, or run 'netsh interface teredo show state' to verify the interface is online.
    Affected if Teredo tunneling interface exists and shows an active IPv6 address (typically 2001::/32 prefix)
  4. Check if firewall permits IPv6 routing header packets
    Review Windows Firewall rules for IPv6 inbound rules, specifically any rules allowing traffic with Routing header type (extension header type 43). Use 'netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all' to inspect.
    Affected if Inbound IPv6 rules explicitly allow packets with Routing headers, or no rules explicitly block them

System is affected if Teredo client is enabled and source routing is not disabled at the OS or network level, allowing processing of IPv6 Routing headers within Teredo-encapsulated traffic.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Disable source routing functionality on Teredo clients, or configure network firewalls and edge devices to explicitly drop all packets containing IPv6 Routing headers regardless of encapsulation.

Fix this in Teredo Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,750
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-6263 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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