CVE-2006-6264
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedTeredo creates trusted peer entries for arbitrary incoming source Teredo addresses, even if the low 32 bits represent an intranet address, which might allow remote attackers to send IPv4 traffic to intranet hosts that use non-RFC1918 addresses, bypassing IPv4 ingress filtering.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceTeredo (IPv6 tunneling protocol) creates trusted peer entries for arbitrary incoming source Teredo addresses without validating whether the low 32 bits represent private/non-RFC1918 intranet addresses. This allows remote attackers to tunnel IPv4 traffic through Teredo to internal hosts using non-RFC1918 addresses (e.g., public IPs that are actually internal), bypassing IPv4 ingress filtering controls.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Determine if Teredo service is runningRun 'netsh interface teredo show state' or check Services for 'IP Helper' service statusAffected if Teredo service is started and running
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Check Teredo interface configurationRun 'netsh interface ipv6 show interface' and look for 'Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface' with state 'connected'Affected if Teredo interface exists and is in connected state
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Verify Teredo type and serverRun 'netsh interface teredo show state' and note the Type (client/enterpriseclient) and Server IP configuredAffected if Teredo is configured as a client connecting to a server, allowing incoming tunneled traffic
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Inspect trusted peer listRun 'netsh interface teredo show state' to see if any peers are listed as trusted. Check registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip6\Parameters\Teredo_Per_Interface for configured peersAffected if Trusted peer entries exist without validation that low 32 bits map to RFC1918 addresses
If Teredo service is enabled and connected (especially as a client), the system may be vulnerable to IPv4 traffic tunneling via crafted Teredo addresses with non-RFC1918 mapped low 32 bits.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement validation of the low 32 bits of incoming Teredo addresses to reject or mark untrusted any that map to RFC1918 private address space (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) or other non-routable addresses before creating trusted peer entries.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-6264 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-6264 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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