CVE-2007-1387
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe DirectShow loader (loader/dshow/DS_VideoDecoder.c) in MPlayer 1.0rc1 and earlier, as used in xine-lib, does not set the biSize before use in a memcpy, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a buffer overflow and possibly execute arbitrary code, a different vulnerability than CVE-2007-1246.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe DirectShow loader in MPlayer 1.0rc1 and earlier (also used in xine-lib) fails to initialize the biSize field of a bitmap info header structure before passing it to memcpy. This causes a buffer overflow when the uninitialized value is used as the copy length, potentially allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via user-assisted attack vectors (e.g., malicious media file).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.0_rc1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Authentication
- Multiple
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed MPlayer versionRun 'mplayer -version' or check package manager for mplayer package versionAffected if Version is 1.0rc1 or earlier (any version <= 1.0_rc1)
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Determine if DirectShow loader is compiledCheck if the 'loader' directory containing dshow components is present in the MPlayer installation; look for DS_VideoDecoder.c or compiled DS_VideoDecoder.oAffected if DirectShow loader component (loader/dshow) is built and present
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Verify the vulnerable code pattern existsIf source is available, inspect loader/dshow/DS_VideoDecoder.c for bitmap info header handling around memcpy calls where biSize field may be used uninitializedAffected if Code shows biSize passed to memcpy without prior initialization in the relevant function
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Check for xine-lib usage if applicableIf using xine-lib as the media playback backend, identify xine-lib version via 'xine-config --version' or package managerAffected if xine-lib is used and version is vulnerable to the same DirectShow loader flaw
You are affected if running MPlayer version 1.0rc1 or earlier with the DirectShow loader component compiled and in use, where uninitialized biSize values could be triggered during media file processing.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to MPlayer 1.0rc2 or later, or apply a patch that ensures biSize is properly initialized before the memcpy operation in loader/dshow/DS_VideoDecoder.c.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-1387 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-1387 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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