CVE-2007-3368
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBuffer overflow in the HTTP server on the Polycom SoundPoint IP 601 SIP phone with BootROM 3.0.x+ allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reboot) via a malformed CGI parameter.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceBuffer overflow in the HTTP server on Polycom SoundPoint IP 601 SIP phones with BootROM 3.0.x+ allows remote attackers to cause denial of service via malformed CGI parameters, triggering device reboot.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= bootrom_3.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify Polycom SoundPoint IP phone models on the networkScan network for devices with Polycom vendor MAC OUI or check DHCP leases/asset inventory for SoundPoint IP 601 or 650 devicesAffected if Polycom SoundPoint IP 601 or 650 phones are present on the network
-
Check BootROM version on the phoneAccess the phone's web interface at http://[phone-ip]/ and navigate to Status > Platform or use the phone's admin menu to view BootROM versionAffected if BootROM version starts with 3.0.x (3.0.0 or higher)
-
Verify HTTP server is enabledAttempt to access the phone's web interface via HTTP on port 80 or check phone settings under Network > Phone > Web ServerAffected if HTTP server is accessible and responding
-
Confirm network exposure of the phone HTTP interfaceCheck firewall rules or network segmentation to determine if the phone HTTP port (80/tcp) is exposed to untrusted networks or the internetAffected if HTTP server is reachable from untrusted networks or directly from the internet
You are affected if you have Polycom SoundPoint IP 601 or 650 phones running BootROM 3.0.x with their HTTP server exposed to network attackers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict access to the phone's HTTP server; contact Polycom for available firmware updates.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-3368 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-3368 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data