CVE-2007-4012
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco 4100 and 4400, Airespace 4000, and Catalyst 6500 and 3750 Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) software 4.1 before 4.1.180.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (ARP storm) via a broadcast ARP packet that "targets the IP address of a known client context", aka CSCsj50374.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in Cisco Wireless LAN Controller software versions prior to 4.1.180.0 allows remote attackers to trigger a denial of service by sending a broadcast ARP packet targeting the IP address of a known wireless client. This causes an ARP storm that overwhelms the controller and disrupts wireless connectivity for all clients.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.2= 3.2.116.21= 4.0= 4.0.155.0= 4.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Cisco WLC device and software versionLog into the WLC CLI (via console or SSH) and run the command 'show version' to display the controller model, software version, and build number. In the GUI, go to Monitor > Controller > Summary to view the software version.Affected if The displayed software version falls within these affected ranges: 3.2 (any version), 3.2.116.21, 4.0 (any version), 4.0.155.0, or 4.1 (any version). Compare your version against these specific versions to confirm if it is below 4.1.180.0.
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Verify network accessibility of the WLC management interfaceDetermine the IP address of the WLC management interface (run 'show interface summary' in CLI or check in GUI under Controller > Interfaces). Attempt to reach this IP address from a network segment that is not explicitly trusted, or review firewall/ACL rules that permit access to UDP port 161 (SNMP) and TCP ports 22/443 (SSH/HTTPS) used for management.Affected if The WLC management interface is reachable from untrusted network segments or the internet without proper ACL filtering, making it susceptible to remote ARP packet injection.
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Confirm wireless clients are associatedIn the WLC GUI, go to Wireless > Clients to list currently associated wireless clients. In CLI, run 'show client summary' to display active client associations including their IP addresses.Affected if There are active wireless clients associated with the controller. The vulnerability specifically requires a known client IP address to be targeted by the malicious broadcast ARP packet.
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Check for ARP storm indicatorsMonitor the WLC CPU utilization (run 'show process cpu history' in CLI or check in GUI under Monitor > Controller > CPU Utilization). Look for unusually high CPU usage that correlates with network disruption. Review ARP table entries using 'show arp' to identify abnormal ARP traffic patterns.Affected if The controller is experiencing unexplained high CPU usage or ARP table instability, which may indicate the vulnerability has been triggered, though this step is confirmatory rather than definitive for detection.
If the Cisco WLC is running any software version prior to 4.1.180.0 within the 3.2, 4.0, or 4.1 version lines AND its management interface is network-accessible to untrusted users, the environment is affected by this CVE.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Cisco WLC software to version 4.1.180.0 or later to patch this vulnerability. In the interim, consider network segmentation or ACLs to restrict untrusted access to the wireless controller management interface.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-4012 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-4012 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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