CVE-2008-0630
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBuffer overflow in url.c in MPlayer 1.0rc2 and SVN before r25823 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted URL that prevents the IPv6 parsing code from setting a pointer to NULL, which causes the buffer to be reused by the unescape code.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBuffer overflow in MPlayer's url.c file where IPv6 parsing code fails to set a pointer to NULL, causing the buffer to be improperly reused by the unescape code. This allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted URLs that trigger the condition.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.02rc2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed MPlayer versionRun 'mplayer -version' or 'mplayer -v' to display version informationAffected if Version displayed is exactly 1.02rc2
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Identify the vulnerable binary locationLocate the mplayer executable using 'which mplayer' or 'where mplayer' on WindowsAffected if The binary exists and was built from the 1.02rc2 source code
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Verify the vulnerable url.c is in useCheck if the binary links against libavformat or contains the url.c parsing logic by running 'ldd mplayer' or examining the binary with 'strings' for 'ipv6' related stringsAffected if The binary contains IPv6 URL parsing code from the affected source version
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Confirm URL handling is accessibleTest that MPlayer can accept URLs as input by attempting to play a media file via URL: 'mplayer http://example.com/test.mp3'Affected if URL input feature is enabled and functional, allowing crafted URLs to be processed
A system is affected if MPlayer version 1.02rc2 is installed and the IPv6 URL parsing functionality is accessible, as the buffer overflow occurs when processing specially crafted URLs through the vulnerable url.c code.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to MPlayer SVN r25823 or later, or apply the patch that ensures proper NULL pointer initialization in the IPv6 parsing code before buffer reuse.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-0630 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-0630 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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