CVE-2008-2548
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedStack-based buffer overflow in the JPEG thumbprint component in the EXIF parser on Motorola cell phones with RAZR firmware allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via an MMS transmission of a malformed JPEG image, which triggers memory corruption.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in the JPEG thumbprint component of the EXIF parser on Motorola RAZR cell phones. A malformed JPEG image delivered via MMS triggers memory corruption, allowing arbitrary code execution with user assistance.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Motorola RAZR devices in your environmentInventory all mobile devices on your network or device management system and filter for Motorola RAZR models (including RAZR V3, V3i, V3x, etc.)Affected if Any Motorola RAZR device is found
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Confirm device is a Motorola RAZRCheck the device model number against the RAZR product line (models V3, V3i, V3x, V6, etc.)Affected if The device model matches any RAZR variant
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Verify MMS is enabled on the deviceCheck device settings for MMS/Multimedia messaging service configuration. On the RAZR, this is typically under Messaging > Options > MMS settingsAffected if MMS functionality is turned on and the device can receive MMS messages
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Check if JPEG image reception is allowedVerify that the device accepts JPEG attachments via MMS. This is the default behavior on RAZR phones with MMS enabledAffected if The device accepts JPEG images through MMS without additional restrictions
If any Motorola RAZR device exists in the environment with MMS enabled, it is affected by this vulnerability since all versions are impacted.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince this is a firmware vulnerability in legacy hardware, organizations should identify and retire affected devices, implement MMS filtering at the gateway level, and educate users not to open MMS from untrusted sources until vendor patches are available.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-2548 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-2548 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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