CVE-2008-4444
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco Unified IP Phone (aka SIP phone) 7960G and 7940G with firmware P0S3-08-9-00 and possibly other versions before 8.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reboot) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a Realtime Transport Protocol (RTP) packet with malformed headers.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA vulnerability in Cisco Unified IP Phone 7960G and 7940G allows remote attackers to send malformed RTP (Realtime Transport Protocol) packets with crafted headers, causing the device to reboot (denial of service) or potentially execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability exists in firmware versions before 8.10.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelPhysically inspect the phone or check network inventory/switch port documentation to confirm the exact model is Cisco Unified IP Phone 7940G or 7960GAffected if The device is a 7940G or 7960G model
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Determine the firmware versionAccess the phone's web interface (http://<phone_ip>) or the Cisco CallManager administration console to view the firmware version fieldAffected if The firmware version is below 8.10 (for example, 8.0, 7.x, or earlier)
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Confirm RTP is enabledVerify the phone is configured to handle voice calls - RTP is the standard protocol used for transmitting audio on IP phones, so if the phone is in active use for calls, RTP is enabled by defaultAffected if The phone is operational and handling voice traffic (RTP is typically enabled by default on these devices)
You are affected if you have a Cisco Unified IP Phone 7940G or 7960G running firmware versions earlier than 8.10, and the phone is actively handling voice calls using RTP.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Cisco IP Phone firmware to version 8.10 or later. Until then, consider network segmentation to limit exposure and implement RTP traffic filtering at network boundaries to block malformed packets.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-4444 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-4444 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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