MailscannerApplication · Debian

CVE-2008-5140

MEDIUM · 6.9 CVSS v2.0 Published 2008-11-18
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
74/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
trend-autoupdate.new in mailscanner 4.55.10 and other versions before 4.74.16-1 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on a (1) /tmp/opr.ini.##### or (2) /tmp/lpt*.zip temporary file.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The trend-autoupdate.new script in MailScanner creates temporary files with predictable names in /tmp (/tmp/opr.ini.##### and /tmp/lpt*.zip). Local users can exploit this by pre-creating symbolic links with these names, causing the script to write to arbitrary files they do not own, potentially leading to privilege escalation or data corruption.

MitigationReplace predictable temporary file creation with secure methods (mkstemp, File::Temp, or a secure temporary directory with restricted permissions) and add symlink checks before file operations. Alternatively, ensure /tmp has the 'sticky' bit set to prevent symlink attacks.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
MailscannerApplication
Affected:= 4.55.10

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
M
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify MailScanner installation and version
    Run 'dpkg -l mailscanner' or 'rpm -qi MailScanner' to check if MailScanner is installed and note its version number
    Affected if The installed version is 4.55.10 on Debian
  2. Locate the trend-autoupdate.new script
    Search for the file using 'find / -name "trend-autoupdate*" 2>/dev/null' to find the vulnerable script in the MailScanner installation path
    Affected if The script exists in the MailScanner /bin or /usr/lib directory
  3. Examine the script for predictable temp file creation
    Use 'grep -E "(/tmp/opr\.ini|/tmp/lpt)"' on the script file to confirm it creates files with predictable names in /tmp
    Affected if The script contains references to /tmp/opr.ini.##### or /tmp/lpt*.zip patterns
  4. Check /tmp directory for sticky bit protection
    Run 'ls -ld /tmp' and verify the last character of the permissions is 't' (sticky bit), or check with 'stat /tmp' for permission bits
    Affected if The sticky bit is NOT set on /tmp (permissions do not end with 't')
  5. Scan for malicious symlinks in /tmp
    Run 'ls -la /tmp/ | grep -E "opr\.ini\.|lpt"' to look for symlinks with names matching the predictable pattern used by the script
    Affected if Symlinks exist with names like opr.ini.***** or lpt*.zip pointing to sensitive locations

You are affected if MailScanner version 4.55.10 is installed, the trend-autoupdate.new script uses predictable /tmp filenames, and /tmp lacks the sticky bit or malicious symlinks are present.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace predictable temporary file creation with secure methods (mkstemp, File::Temp, or a secure temporary directory with restricted permissions) and add symlink checks before file operations. Alternatively, ensure /tmp has the 'sticky' bit set to prevent symlink attacks.

Fix this in Mailscanner Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing1.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
5.0 hours of engineering $890
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-5140 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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