CVE-2008-5140
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedtrend-autoupdate.new in mailscanner 4.55.10 and other versions before 4.74.16-1 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on a (1) /tmp/opr.ini.##### or (2) /tmp/lpt*.zip temporary file.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe trend-autoupdate.new script in MailScanner creates temporary files with predictable names in /tmp (/tmp/opr.ini.##### and /tmp/lpt*.zip). Local users can exploit this by pre-creating symbolic links with these names, causing the script to write to arbitrary files they do not own, potentially leading to privilege escalation or data corruption.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.55.10CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify MailScanner installation and versionRun 'dpkg -l mailscanner' or 'rpm -qi MailScanner' to check if MailScanner is installed and note its version numberAffected if The installed version is 4.55.10 on Debian
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Locate the trend-autoupdate.new scriptSearch for the file using 'find / -name "trend-autoupdate*" 2>/dev/null' to find the vulnerable script in the MailScanner installation pathAffected if The script exists in the MailScanner /bin or /usr/lib directory
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Examine the script for predictable temp file creationUse 'grep -E "(/tmp/opr\.ini|/tmp/lpt)"' on the script file to confirm it creates files with predictable names in /tmpAffected if The script contains references to /tmp/opr.ini.##### or /tmp/lpt*.zip patterns
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Check /tmp directory for sticky bit protectionRun 'ls -ld /tmp' and verify the last character of the permissions is 't' (sticky bit), or check with 'stat /tmp' for permission bitsAffected if The sticky bit is NOT set on /tmp (permissions do not end with 't')
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Scan for malicious symlinks in /tmpRun 'ls -la /tmp/ | grep -E "opr\.ini\.|lpt"' to look for symlinks with names matching the predictable pattern used by the scriptAffected if Symlinks exist with names like opr.ini.***** or lpt*.zip pointing to sensitive locations
You are affected if MailScanner version 4.55.10 is installed, the trend-autoupdate.new script uses predictable /tmp filenames, and /tmp lacks the sticky bit or malicious symlinks are present.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace predictable temporary file creation with secure methods (mkstemp, File::Temp, or a secure temporary directory with restricted permissions) and add symlink checks before file operations. Alternatively, ensure /tmp has the 'sticky' bit set to prevent symlink attacks.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-5140 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-5140 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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