CVE-2010-3292
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe update{_bad,}_phishing_sites scripts in mailscanner 4.79.11-2 downloads files and trusts them without using encryption (e.g., https) or digital signature checking which could allow an attacker to replace certain configuration files (e.g., phishing whitelist) via dns/packet spoofing.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe update{_bad,}_phishing_sites scripts in MailScanner version 4.79.11-2 download configuration files (phishing whitelists) over unencrypted HTTP connections without performing any digital signature verification, enabling an attacker with man-in-the-middle or DNS spoofing capabilities to inject malicious content into these configuration files.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.79.11-2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed MailScanner versionRun 'MailScanner --version' or check the package manager for the installed MailScanner package versionAffected if The installed version is exactly 4.79.11-2 (this CVE affects only that specific version)
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Locate the update phishing site scriptsFind the update_bad_phishing_sites and update_phishing_sites scripts in the MailScanner installation directory (typically in /usr/local/mailscanner/bin/ or the scripts/ subdirectory)Affected if These scripts exist on the system and are part of MailScanner 4.79.11-2
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Inspect script download mechanismOpen the update scripts and examine the URL variables or curl/wget commands used to fetch configuration files. Look for HTTP:// URLs versus HTTPS:// URLsAffected if The scripts use unencrypted HTTP (http://) URLs to download phishing whitelist configuration files
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Check for signature verificationSearch the update scripts for GPG, gpg, --verify, or signature-related functions. Also check if a .gnupg or similar trust store directory exists and is configuredAffected if No digital signature verification is performed on downloaded files before they are deployed
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Verify phishing whitelist download URL in configCheck MailScanner configuration files (MailScanner.conf or related files) for the phishing whitelist URL settings. Look for URLs starting with http:// rather than https://Affected if The configuration specifies HTTP for downloading phishing whitelists, making the download vulnerable to injection
A system is affected if MailScanner version 4.79.11-2 is installed AND the update_phishing_sites scripts download configuration files over HTTP without GPG signature verification.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataConfigure the update scripts to download files exclusively over HTTPS and/or implement GPG/digital signature verification of downloaded files before they are deployed to prevent tampering.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-3292 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-3292 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data