CVE-2009-0568
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe RPC Marshalling Engine (aka NDR) in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP2 and SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, and Server 2008 SP2 does not properly maintain its internal state, which allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary memory locations via a crafted RPC message that triggers incorrect pointer reading, related to "IDL interfaces containing a non-conformant varying array" and FC_SMVARRAY, FC_LGVARRAY, FC_VARIABLE_REPEAT, and FC_VARIABLE_OFFSET, aka "RPC Marshalling Engine Vulnerability."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe RPC Marshalling Engine (NDR) in multiple Windows versions fails to properly maintain internal state when processing non-conformant varying arrays in IDL interfaces. Attackers can send crafted RPC messages using specific format codes (FC_SMVARRAY, FC_LGVARRAY, FC_VARIABLE_REPEAT, FC_VARIABLE_OFFSET) to trigger incorrect pointer reading, allowing arbitrary memory overwrite and remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versions= 2008all versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Windows versionRun 'systeminfo' from command prompt or check via 'winver'. Look at the OS Name and Version fields.Affected if The operating system is Windows 2000 (any version), Windows 2003 Server (any version), Windows Server 2008 (any version), Windows Vista (any version), or Windows XP (any version).
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Verify RPC service is runningOpen Services console (services.msc) and locate 'Remote Procedure Call (RPC)' service, or run 'sc query RpcSs' from command prompt.Affected if The RPC service (RpcSs) is in Running state - this is the default state on affected Windows versions.
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Check RPC endpoint mapper statusRun 'rpcping -s localhost' or check if port 135 (RPC Endpoint Mapper) is listening via 'netstat -an | findstr :135'.Affected if RPC endpoints are exposed, particularly on systems accessible from untrusted networks. By default, RPC services listen on port 135 and dynamic ports.
You are affected if you are running any version of Windows 2000, Windows 2003 Server, Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista, or Windows XP, and the RPC service (RpcSs) is running and accessible (the default configuration on these systems).
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the Microsoft security update MS09-026 to patch the RPC Marshalling Engine vulnerability on all affected systems, and restrict RPC endpoint exposure to untrusted networks to reduce attack surface.
Upgrade to a supported Windows version such as Windows 10/11 or Windows Server 2016 and later. For systems that can still receive updates, apply Microsoft security patch MS09-026 (KB 961501).
- Identify all affected systems running Windows 2000, XP (SP2/SP3), Server 2003 (SP2), Vista (Gold/SP1/SP2), or Server 2008 that have RPC exposure (listening on TCP/135, 445, or other RPC endpoints)
- Prioritize systems with direct internet exposure or network accessibility from untrusted zones
- For Windows XP SP2/SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP1/SP2, and Server 2008 SP2: Check if Microsoft security patch MS09-026 can be applied (note: Windows 2000 reached end of support in 2010 and no patches are available)
- If MS09-026 is not available or systems are too old: Plan migration to a supported Windows version (Windows 10, Windows 11, or Windows Server 2016+)
- If immediate upgrade is not possible: Disable RPC services where not required, block RPC ports (135, 139, 445, and high ports) at network perimeter firewalls for untrusted connections
- Apply the Microsoft patch MS09-026 from June 2009 if available for your specific Windows version (KB 961501)
- After patching or upgrade, verify RPC services function correctly and validate vulnerability is remediated
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2009-0568 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2009-0568 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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