CVE-2010-3037
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedgoform/websXMLAdminRequestCgi.cgi in Cisco Unified Videoconferencing (UVC) System 5110 and 5115, and possibly Unified Videoconferencing System 3545 and 5230, Unified Videoconferencing 3527 Primary Rate Interface (PRI) Gateway, Unified Videoconferencing 3522 Basic Rate Interfaces (BRI) Gateway, and Unified Videoconferencing 3515 Multipoint Control Unit (MCU), allows remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands via the username field, related to a "shell command injection vulnerability," aka Bug ID CSCti54059.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceShell command injection vulnerability in Cisco UVC systems' web administration CGI script (goform/websXMLAdminRequestCgi.cgi). The username parameter in the admin request handler fails to sanitize input properly, allowing authenticated administrators to inject and execute arbitrary operating system commands on the affected device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3all versionsall versions= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Cisco UVC device modelAccess the device web interface or check the device label/management console to determine if the model is one of: Cisco Unified Videoconferencing System 5110, 5115, 3515, 3522, 3527, or 3545Affected if The device model is any of the listed affected models (5110, 5115, 3515, 3522, 3527, 3545)
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Check the firmware versionLocate the firmware version in the device web administration interface (typically under System Info or Maintenance > Firmware Upgrade) or via CLI command 'show version' if SSH is availableAffected if For models 5110/5115: any firmware version is affected. For models 3515/3522/3527/3545: firmware version equals 7.0.1.13.3 specifically
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Verify the web CGI script is exposedAttempt to access the CGI endpoint goform/websXMLAdminRequestCgi.cgi via HTTP/HTTPS on the device (e.g., https://<device-ip>/goform/websXMLAdminRequestCgi.cgi)Affected if The endpoint returns a response (even if error) indicating the CGI script exists and is accessible on the network
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Confirm administrative access is enabledCheck if the web administration interface allows login authentication, or review access control lists/network exposure of the management interfaceAffected if The device administrative interface is reachable from the network and accepts authentication attempts (the vulnerability requires authenticated administrator access to exploit)
A user is affected if they have a Cisco UVC 5110/5115 (any version) or 3515/3522/3527/3545 running firmware 7.0.1.13.3, with the web CGI script exposed and administrative authentication enabled.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied patches for Cisco Unified Videoconferencing systems (Bug ID CSCti54059). If patches are unavailable due to product age, consider network segmentation and restrict administrative access to trusted IPs, or evaluate migration to supported hardware as these are legacy 2010-era products.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-3037 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-3037 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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