CVE-2010-4305
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco Unified Videoconferencing (UVC) System 3545, 5110, 5115, and 5230; Unified Videoconferencing 3527 Primary Rate Interface (PRI) Gateway; Unified Videoconferencing 3522 Basic Rate Interfaces (BRI) Gateway; and Unified Videoconferencing 3515 Multipoint Control Unit (MCU) improperly use cookies for web-interface credentials, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by reading a (1) cleartext or (2) base64-encoded cleartext cookie, aka Bug ID CSCti54052.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Cisco UVC systems store web-interface credentials in HTTP cookies either as cleartext or base64-encoded cleartext instead of using secure, session-based authentication mechanisms. This allows remote attackers to intercept or read these cookies to obtain valid user credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3all versionsall versions= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3= 7.0.1.13.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco UVC device modelAccess the device web interface or use SNMP/CLI to retrieve the system model number. Look for model identifiers: 5110, 5115, 3515, 3522, 3527, or 3545.Affected if The device model is any of the listed Cisco Unified Videoconferencing models (5110, 5115, 3515, 3522, 3527, or 3545).
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Check firmware versionIn the device web interface, navigate to the system information or administration section to view the firmware version. Alternatively, access via CLI and use commands like 'show version' or 'show system' to retrieve firmware details.Affected if The firmware version is 7.0.1.13.3, or for models 5110/5115, any firmware version since they are affected across all versions.
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Capture and inspect HTTP cookies during loginUse a web browser developer tool or a network proxy (such as Burp Suite or Wireshark) to capture HTTP traffic when authenticating to the device web interface. Examine the Set-Cookie headers and subsequent request cookies.Affected if The HTTP cookies contain user credentials (username/password) either as cleartext or base64-encoded values.
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Verify cookie contents for credential patternsExamine captured cookie values. Look for base64-decoded strings that contain username and password pairs in formats like 'username:password' or similar credential patterns.Affected if Decoding cookie values reveals plaintext user credentials used for web interface authentication.
The environment is affected if the device is a Cisco UVC 5110, 5115, 3515, 3522, 3527, or 3545 running firmware 7.0.1.13.3 (or any version for 5110/5115) and HTTP cookies are found to contain credentials in cleartext or base64-encoded form.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade affected Cisco UVC devices to patched firmware versions if available, or implement additional authentication layers (VPN, multi-factor auth) in front of the web interface to mitigate credential exposure.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-4305 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-4305 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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