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Intelligent Contact ManagerApplication · Cisco

CVE-2010-3040

HIGH · 10.0 CVSS v2.0 Published 2010-11-09
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 6.0 or later.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in agent.exe in Setup Manager in Cisco Intelligent Contact Manager (ICM) before 7.0 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long parameter in a (1) HandleUpgradeAll, (2) AgentUpgrade, (3) HandleQueryNodeInfoReq, or (4) HandleUpgradeTrace TCP packet, aka Bug IDs CSCti45698, CSCti45715, CSCti45726, and CSCti46164.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the Setup Manager agent.exe component of Cisco Intelligent Contact Manager (ICM) prior to version 7.0. Remote attackers can execute arbitrary code by sending specially crafted TCP packets with overly long parameters to four specific functions: HandleUpgradeAll, AgentUpgrade, HandleQueryNodeInfoReq, and HandleUpgradeTrace. The CVSS 10 score indicates trivial exploitability with no authentication required.

MitigationApply Cisco ICM version 7.0 or later to patch the vulnerable agent.exe component. If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict network access to the Setup Manager service using firewalls or network segmentation to prevent unauthenticated remote exploitation.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Intelligent Contact ManagerApplication
Affected:<= 6.0\(0\)a\(1\)= 5.0= 5.0\(0\)= 5.0\(0\)_sr2= 5.0\(0\)_sr3= 5.0\(0\)_sr4= 5.0\(0\)_sr5= 5.0\(0\)_sr7= 5.0\(0\)_sr8= 5.0\(0\)_sr9= 5.0\(0\)_sr10= 5.0\(0\)_sr11

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Cisco ICM installation and version
    Use system inventory tools or check for Cisco ICM software on the system. Look for Cisco ICM or related product directories. Query the installed software or use 'wmic product get name,version' if available.
    Affected if The installed version is 5.0 (any release) or 6.0(0)a(1) or lower, meaning it is within the affected version ranges.
  2. Locate the agent.exe component
    Search for 'agent.exe' in Cisco ICM installation directories, typically under the Setup Manager or related ICM subdirectories. Check common paths like C:\Program Files\Cisco\ or associated ICM folders.
    Affected if The agent.exe file exists and its version corresponds to an affected ICM version (5.0.x or 6.0(0)a(1)).
  3. Verify Setup Manager service status
    Check if the Setup Manager service is running on the system using 'sc query' or the Services control panel. Look for services named 'Setup Manager' or related ICM configuration services.
    Affected if The Setup Manager service is installed and running, exposing the vulnerable agent.exe component.
  4. Assess network exposure of Setup Manager
    Identify the listening TCP port for the Setup Manager service using 'netstat -an' or port scanning tools. Check for open ports associated with ICM Setup Manager (typically admin/config ports).
    Affected if The Setup Manager service is listening on a network-accessible TCP port and is reachable from network segments that could contain attackers.

A system is affected if it runs Cisco ICM version 5.0 (any release) or 6.0(0)a(1) or lower with the Setup Manager agent.exe component exposed on the network.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 6.0
Interim mitigation

Apply Cisco ICM version 7.0 or later to patch the vulnerable agent.exe component. If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict network access to the Setup Manager service using firewalls or network segmentation to prevent unauthenticated remote exploitation.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

Cisco Intelligent Contact Manager version 7.0 or later

  1. Verify current Cisco ICM version by checking the agent.exe file version or system information
  2. Backup all ICM configuration data and database before performing upgrade
  3. Ensure the upgrade environment meets prerequisites for ICM version 7.0 or later
  4. Obtain the Cisco ICM 7.0 software from Cisco official download portal or through authorized Cisco support channels
  5. Schedule maintenance window as upgrade may require system downtime
  6. Follow Cisco ICM upgrade documentation to perform upgrade from current version to 7.0 or later
  7. After upgrade, verify that agent.exe version is 7.0 or higher and the specific vulnerabilities (CSCti45698, CSCti45715, CSCti45726, CSCti46164) are addressed
  8. Test critical contact center functionalities post-upgrade to ensure normal operations
Caveat Ensure compatibility with existing contact center infrastructure and verify that custom integrations with ICM 5.x/6.x work correctly after upgrade

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Intelligent Contact Manager Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing10.0 h
  • Review / QA5.0 h
33.0 hours of engineering $5,760
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-3040 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data