CVE-2011-1729
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedStack-based buffer overflow in OmniInet.exe in the Backup Client Service in HP OpenView Storage Data Protector 6.00, 6.10, and 6.11 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malformed GET_FILE message.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in OmniInet.exe (Backup Client Service) in HP OpenView Storage Data Protector versions 6.00, 6.10, and 6.11 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malformed GET_FILE message.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.00= 6.10= 6.11CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if HP OpenView Storage Data Protector is installedCheck for the presence of the Data Protector installation directory (typically at C:\Program Files\HP\Data Protector or /opt/omni), or search for the OmniInet.exe file on the systemAffected if The software is not found on the system, the user is not affected
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Determine the installed version of HP OpenView Storage Data ProtectorCheck the version by examining the binary properties of OmniInet.exe, or look for a version file in the installation directory, or use the 'omniversion' command if availableAffected if The installed version matches exactly 6.00, 6.10, or 6.11 - these specific versions are vulnerable
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Verify the OmniInet.exe (Backup Client Service) is runningCheck running processes for omniinet.exe or check Windows Services for the 'OmniInet' service status, or on Unix check for the omniinet processAffected if The service is running and the version is one of the affected versions listed above, the user is vulnerable to remote exploitation
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Determine if the Backup Client Service port is exposed to untrusted networksCheck which network interfaces the service is listening on. By default Data Protector uses port 5555 for OmniInet. Use 'netstat -an' or similar tools to see if the port is bound to 0.0.0.0 or an external IP address rather than only localhostAffected if The service port is accessible from untrusted network segments, the remote code execution vulnerability can be exploited by external attackers
A user is affected if HP OpenView Storage Data Protector version 6.00, 6.10, or 6.11 is installed with the OmniInet.exe service running and the port is accessible from the network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a patched version of HP OpenView Storage Data Protector if available; otherwise, restrict network access to the Backup Client Service port or implement compensating controls such as network segmentation.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-1729 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-1729 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data