Anyconnect Secure Mobility ClientApplication · Cisco

CVE-2012-2499

MEDIUM · 5.8 CVSS v2.0 Published 2012-08-06
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
67/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The IPsec implementation in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client 3.0 before 3.0.08057 does not verify the certificate name in an X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers via a crafted certificate, aka Bug ID CSCtz26985.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The IPsec implementation in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client versions before 3.0.08057 fails to verify the certificate name field in X.509 certificates during the authentication handshake. This allows an attacker positioned on the network path to present a specially crafted certificate with a different subject name, causing the client to trust a malicious server and enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.

MitigationUpgrade Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client to version 3.0.08057 or later which includes proper certificate name verification.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Anyconnect Secure Mobility ClientApplication
Affected:= 3.0= 3.0.0629= 3.0.07059

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
M
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the installed Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client version
    Locate the AnyConnect client installation and retrieve its version number (commonly found in the client GUI about section, or via the installer properties on Windows systems)
    Affected if The installed version matches 3.0, 3.0.0629, or 3.0.07059, or falls within the range before 3.0.08057
  2. Confirm IPsec VPN profile is configured
    Check if AnyConnect is configured to use IPsec as the tunneling protocol (this can be verified in the AnyConnect profile XML configuration or VPN connection settings)
    Affected if IPsec is the active VPN protocol for the connection profile in use
  3. Verify certificate-based authentication is enabled
    Examine the authentication settings for the IPsec connection profile to confirm certificate authentication is configured as the authentication method
    Affected if Certificate-based authentication is the configured authentication mechanism for the IPsec VPN
  4. Confirm the connection is vulnerable during handshake
    Observe that the client accepts the server certificate without validating the subject name field during the TLS/IPsec handshake phase
    Affected if The client completes the connection without performing proper certificate name (subject) validation

A user is affected if they are running AnyConnect version 3.0 through 3.0.07059 with IPsec and certificate-based authentication enabled, as the client will not validate the certificate name field during the authentication handshake.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client to version 3.0.08057 or later which includes proper certificate name verification.

Fix this in Anyconnect Secure Mobility Client Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
6.0 hours of engineering $1,040
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-2499 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-2499 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data