CVE-2012-4074
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Board Management Controller (BMC) in the Serial over LAN (SoL) subsystem in Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) relies on a hardcoded private key, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain sensitive information or modify the data stream by leveraging knowledge of this key, aka Bug ID CSCte90338.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Board Management Controller (BMC) in Cisco UCS uses a hardcoded private key for the Serial over LAN (SoL) subsystem, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to decrypt communications or inject/modify data by leveraging knowledge of this static cryptographic key.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco UCS systemDetermine if the target system is a Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) by checking hardware inventory, BMC web interface, or UCS Manager softwareAffected if System is a Cisco UCS platform (all versions are affected)
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Check BMC firmware versionAccess the BMC web interface or use IPMI/Redfish commands to query the BMC firmware version (e.g., 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U admin -P password mc info' or via UCS Manager)Affected if Any Cisco UCS firmware version (all versions contain the hardcoded key)
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Verify SoL is enabledCheck the Serial over LAN configuration status via UCS Manager, BMC web interface, or IPMI command (e.g., 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U admin -P password sol activate' to check status, or check BMC settings for SoL session parameters)Affected if SoL feature is actively enabled and configured on the BMC
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Assess BMC network exposureDetermine if the BMC management interface is accessible from untrusted networks by reviewing network segmentation, VLAN configuration, and firewall rules for the BMC IP addressAffected if BMC is reachable from network segments containing untrusted systems
User is affected if they operate a Cisco UCS system with SoL enabled and the BMC is network accessible, as the hardcoded key vulnerability enables decryption of SoL traffic.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Cisco-provided firmware updates that replace the hardcoded key with proper key management. In the interim, isolate the management network and restrict SoL access to trusted endpoints.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-4074 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-4074 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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