Unified Computing SystemHardware / appliance · Cisco

CVE-2012-4089

MEDIUM · 6.6 CVSS v2.0 Published 2013-09-24
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
68/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
MCTOOLS in the fabric interconnect in Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) allows local users to execute arbitrary Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) commands by leveraging (1) local, (2) shell-level, or (3) debug-level privileges at the operating-system layer, aka Bug ID CSCtg76239.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Local privilege escalation vulnerability in MCTOOLS component of Cisco UCS fabric interconnect allows local users with local, shell-level, or debug-level OS privileges to execute arbitrary Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) commands, potentially giving full control over server out-of-band management.

MitigationApply available Cisco patches for CSCtg76239; restrict local OS access and remove unnecessary elevated privileges; consider network segmentation of management interfaces.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Unified Computing SystemHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
M
Authentication
Single
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:L/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Cisco UCS fabric interconnect system
    Determine if the system is a Cisco UCS fabric interconnect (UCS 6200, 6300, 6400 series or similar). Check system inventory or network documentation for fabric interconnect model information.
    Affected if The system is a Cisco UCS fabric interconnect running any version of Cisco Unified Computing System
  2. Verify MCTOOLS component presence
    Locate the MCTOOLS utility on the fabric interconnect. Check common Cisco utility directories or use 'find' command to locate mctools binary if shell access is available.
    Affected if MCTOOLS component is present and executable on the system
  3. Check local user privilege levels
    Review local user accounts on the fabric interconnect OS. Identify accounts with local, shell-level, or debug-level OS privileges using 'whoami', 'id', or user listing commands.
    Affected if Local user accounts exist with shell-level, debug-level, or elevated OS privileges beyond standard user
  4. Assess BMC command execution capability
    Determine if unprivileged local users can invoke MCTOOLS to execute BMC commands. Test if the tool can be run without authentication or with standard user privileges.
    Affected if Users with local/shell/debug-level privileges can execute arbitrary BMC commands through MCTOOLS without additional authorization checks

A defender is affected if they operate a Cisco UCS fabric interconnect where local users with elevated but non-administrative OS privileges can execute BMC commands via the MCTOOLS component, bypassing proper authorization controls.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply available Cisco patches for CSCtg76239; restrict local OS access and remove unnecessary elevated privileges; consider network segmentation of management interfaces.

Fix this in Unified Computing System Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
20.0 hours of engineering $3,600
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-4089 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-4089 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data