Unified Computing SystemHardware / appliance · Cisco
CVE-2012-4096
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe local file editor in the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) in Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) allows local users to gain privileges and modify arbitrary fabric-interconnect files, in the context of a vi process, via unspecified commands, aka Bug ID CSCtn06574.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceLocal privilege escalation vulnerability in Cisco UCS Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) file editor. Authenticated local users can escape the vi editor context and modify arbitrary fabric-interconnect files, potentially gaining elevated privileges beyond their intended access level.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Unified Computing SystemHardware / appliance
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- None
AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco UCS BMC interfaceAccess the BMC management interface (typically via IPMI or web UI at the BMC IP address) and confirm it is a Cisco Unified Computing System Baseboard Management Controller. Look for Cisco UCS branding or login prompts referencing BMC/CMC.Affected if The system is a Cisco UCS with an accessible BMC management interface.
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Verify authenticated user access to BMCCheck if local user accounts (beyond administrative/root) have valid credentials to log into the BMC interface. Attempt to authenticate with a non-privileged local account if one exists.Affected if Non-administrative local users can authenticate to the BMC interface.
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Confirm file editor functionality existsOnce logged into BMC, navigate to file editor or shell access features. Look for vi editor or similar file editing capabilities within the BMC CLI or web interface.Affected if The BMC provides a file editor (vi editor) accessible to authenticated local users.
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Assess physical and logical access controlsReview who has access to the BMC management network/IP and physical access to the server chassis. Check for uncontrolled local user accounts with BMC access.Affected if Untrusted or unauthorized local users have physical or network access to the BMC interface.
A user is affected if they run Cisco UCS with BMC file editor access available to local authenticated users beyond trusted administrators, as the vulnerability allows privilege escalation via vi context escape.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the relevant Cisco UCS firmware update that addresses CSCtn06574. Restrict physical and logical access to the BMC management interface to trusted personnel only until the patch is deployed.
Fix this in Unified Computing System
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,816.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-4096 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-4096 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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