CVE-2012-4948
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe default configuration of Fortinet Fortigate UTM appliances uses the same Certification Authority certificate and same private key across different customers' installations, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers by leveraging the presence of the Fortinet_CA_SSLProxy certificate in a list of trusted root certification authorities.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceFortinet Fortigate UTM appliances ship with a default SSL proxy CA certificate (Fortinet_CA_SSLProxy) and private key that is identical across all customer installations. An attacker who obtains this shared private key can perform man-in-the-middle attacks against SSL-encrypted sessions, spoofing legitimate servers since the certificate exists in the trusted root CA store.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:A/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm Fortigate model is affectedIdentify the Fortigate model number via CLI command 'get system status' or through the web interface under Dashboard > Status. Check if the model is one of: 1000c, 100d, 110c, 1240b, 200b, 20c, 300c, or 3040b.Affected if The model is any of the listed affected models and is running any firmware version.
-
Verify SSL proxy feature is enabledCheck SSL proxy or SSL inspection configuration via CLI using 'get vpn ssl settings' or through the web interface under Security Profiles > SSL/SSH Inspection. Look for SSL proxy settings.Affected if The SSL proxy feature is enabled and configured to inspect SSL traffic.
-
Identify the CA certificate used for SSL proxyInspect the CA certificate configured for SSL proxy via CLI command 'get vpn ssl settings' or through the web interface under Security Profiles > SSL/SSH Inspection > CA Certificate. Identify which certificate is assigned as the proxy CA.Affected if The configured CA certificate is the default 'Fortinet_CA_SSLProxy' certificate.
-
Check if default certificate has been replacedReview the CA certificate list via CLI command 'get vpn certificate ca list' or through the web interface under System > Certificates. Compare the SSL proxy CA against the default Fortinet certificate to determine if a unique, customer-generated certificate is in use.Affected if The default Fortinet_CA_SSLProxy certificate remains in use and has not been replaced with a unique certificate.
The environment is affected if the Fortigate model is one of the affected models, SSL proxy inspection is enabled, and the default Fortinet_CA_SSLProxy certificate is still being used rather than a unique customer-specific CA certificate.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the default Fortinet_CA_SSLProxy certificate with a unique, customer-specific CA certificate generated on each appliance. This is typically done through the FortiGate web interface or CLI by generating a new certificate signing request or creating a local certificate authority.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-4948 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-4948 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data