Telepresence Video Communication Servers SoftwareApplication · Cisco

CVE-2012-5444

MEDIUM · 5.0 CVSS v2.0 Published 2013-01-17
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
59/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Cisco TelePresence Video Communication Server (VCS) X7.0.3 does not properly process certain search rules, which allows remote attackers to create conferences via an unspecified Conductor request, aka Bug ID CSCub67989.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

Cisco TelePresence VCS X7.0.3 fails to properly process certain search rules, allowing remote unauthenticated attackers to create conferences via specially crafted Conductor requests. This appears to be a logic flaw in how the VCS validates and processes search rule configurations from Conductor.

MitigationUpgrade Cisco TelePresence VCS to a patched version beyond X7.0.3. As an interim control, restrict network access to the VCS and Conductor management interfaces to trusted IPs only.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Telepresence Video Communication Servers SoftwareApplication
Affected:= x7.0.3

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the installed VCS software version
    Use the VCS administrative interface or CLI command 'xstatus systemunit' to retrieve the exact software version running on the Cisco TelePresence VCS
    Affected if The version displayed is exactly X7.0.3 (the specific build number may vary but the major.minor.patch must match 7.0.3)
  2. Verify whether Conductor integration is enabled
    Access the VCS admin UI and navigate to B2BUA > Conductor or check for Conductor-related configuration via CLI using 'show Conductor' or similar status commands
    Affected if Conductor integration is enabled and the VCS is configured to accept search rules or conference requests from Conductor
  3. Inspect active search rule configurations
    Review the search rules defined on the VCS via the web interface under 'Search rules' or using CLI commands such as 'show searchrules' to see which rules are active
    Affected if There are search rules configured that accept requests from Conductor sources or wildcard patterns that could receive unauthenticated input
  4. Assess network accessibility of management interfaces
    Determine if the VCS administrative ports (typically HTTPS admin port) and Conductor communication ports are exposed to untrusted networks by reviewing firewall rules, ACLs, or interface bindings
    Affected if The VCS management or API interfaces are reachable from untrusted networks without IP-based access restrictions

A user is affected if the VCS runs exactly version X7.0.3, has Conductor integration enabled, and has search rules that could process requests from Conductor without proper validation, especially if the management interface is externally accessible.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade Cisco TelePresence VCS to a patched version beyond X7.0.3. As an interim control, restrict network access to the VCS and Conductor management interfaces to trusted IPs only.

Fix this in Telepresence Video Communication Servers Software Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
7.0 hours of engineering $1,240
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-5444 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

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What belongs here
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