Dasdec EasHardware / appliance · Digital Alert Systems

CVE-2013-0137

HIGH · 10.0 CVSS v2.0 Published 2013-06-30
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 2.0-1 or later.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The default configuration of the Digital Alert Systems DASDEC EAS device before 2.0-2 and the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net EAS device before 2.0-2 contains a known SSH private key, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain root access, and spoof alerts, via an SSH session.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The DASDEC EAS and Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net devices shipped with a hardcoded/default SSH private key in their firmware. An attacker with knowledge of this key can SSH directly to the device as root, allowing full system compromise and ability to spoof emergency alerts.

MitigationUpgrade firmware to version 2.0-2 or later which removes the known SSH private key, or disable SSH access if not required for operations.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Dasdec EasHardware / appliance
Affected:<= 2.0-1= 2.0-0
R189 One Net EasHardware / appliance
Affected:<= 2.0-1= 2.0-0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify device model and firmware version
    Access the device admin interface or check system information to determine the exact firmware version running on the DASDEC EAS or Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net device
    Affected if The firmware version is 2.0-0 or 2.0-1 or any version <= 2.0-1
  2. Verify if SSH service is enabled
    Check the device configuration or running services to determine if SSH access is enabled on the device
    Affected if SSH service is enabled and accessible on the network
  3. Inspect for presence of default SSH private key
    Examine the device filesystem for SSH private key files in typical locations such as /etc/ssh/, ~/.ssh/, or embedded in firmware configuration
    Affected if A known default or hardcoded SSH private key is present in the system
  4. Review SSH authorized_keys configuration
    Check the root or administrative user authorized_keys file for any keys that were not explicitly added by your organization
    Affected if SSH authorized_keys contains keys that were not provisioned by your organization

The device is affected if it runs firmware version 2.0-0 or 2.0-1 (or <= 2.0-1) with SSH enabled and contains the hardcoded SSH private key, allowing unauthenticated root access.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 2.0-1
Interim mitigation

Upgrade firmware to version 2.0-2 or later which removes the known SSH private key, or disable SSH access if not required for operations.

Recommended fix High confidence

2.0-2

  1. Upgrade the Digital Alert Systems DASDEC EAS device to firmware version 2.0-2 or later
  2. Upgrade the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net EAS device to firmware version 2.0-2 or later
  3. After upgrading, verify SSH configuration does not contain default or embedded private keys
  4. Regenerate any SSH host keys if they were not regenerated during upgrade
  5. Verify remote SSH access uses proper authentication after the upgrade

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Dasdec Eas Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
16.0 hours of engineering $2,840
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,544.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-0137 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-0137 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data