CVE-2013-4735
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Digital Alert Systems DASDEC EAS device before 2.0-2 and the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net EAS device before 2.0-2 have a default password for an administrative account, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via an IP network.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Digital Alert Systems DASDEC and Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net EAS (Emergency Alert System) devices have a hardcoded default password for the administrative account. Attackers on the IP network can use this credential to remotely authenticate and gain full administrative access to these devices, potentially allowing manipulation of emergency alerts or further network compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.0-1= 2.0-0<= 2.0-1= 2.0-0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the physical device or check the admin web interface for the product name and model number (typically displayed on the login page or in About/System Information section)Affected if Device is a Digital Alert Systems DASDEC or Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net EAS unit
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the device admin web interface and navigate to the About, System Information, or Status page to view the firmware version; alternatively, check via SNMP or the device's serial consoleAffected if Firmware version is 2.0-0 or any version <= 2.0-1 (2.0-1 and earlier)
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Verify if default credentials are in useAttempt to log into the administrative web interface using the known default username and password for these devices (check product documentation for the default credential pair); if authentication succeeds without having changed the password, the default is still activeAffected if The default administrative password has not been changed from the factory default
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Confirm network accessibility of admin interfaceCheck if the device administrative web interface (typically ports 80/443 or custom HTTP port) is reachable from network segments that contain untrusted users or from the internet; verify ACLs or firewall rules protecting the management interfaceAffected if The administrative interface is exposed to untrusted network segments or the internet
A user is affected if they have a DASDEC or R189 One-Net EAS device running firmware version 2.0-0 through 2.0-1 with the default administrative password still enabled and the management interface accessible from an untrusted network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedChange the default administrative password immediately and upgrade to firmware version 2.0-2 or later. Network-segment these devices and restrict management access to authorized IPs.
2.0-2 or later
- Identify the current DASDEC or Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net EAS device firmware version
- Backup the current device configuration before upgrading
- Upgrade the device firmware to version 2.0-2 or later (the fixed release)
- After upgrading, change the default administrative password to a strong, unique password
- Verify the upgrade was successful and the new password is in effect
- Ensure the device is not directly exposed to the internet via untrusted networks
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-4735 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-4735 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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